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I. INTRODUCTION 
Like much of the debate over medical marijuana, the popular 
response to the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Raich v. Ashcroft1 
has focused largely on drug policy and criminal justice issues.2  
Meanwhile, the discussion among legal academics revolves around 
broad Commerce Clause questions such as the role of the “broader 
regulatory scheme” doctrine, the meaning of Wickard after Lopez, 
and the place of the traditional state interest inquiry in Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence.3  The Supreme Court’s consideration of the 
Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Raich, which held unconstitutional the 
Controlled Substances Act as applied to four medical marijuana 
patients and caregivers, will undoubtedly have the most immediate 
and dramatic impact in these two areas.  But the case also frames 
an important and more specific question about the relationship 
between federal and state powers over health care: the extent to 
which health care activity should be regulated by state and local, 
rather than federal, government. 
This article considers to what extent health care may be viewed 
as a traditional area of state concern in the context of the Supreme 
Court’s revival of federalism principles, in particular limits on 
Congress’ Commerce Clause power, and what effect Raich v. 
Ashcroft, heard by the Court in the fall 2004 term,4 might have on 
these issues.  Addressing these questions will necessarily involve 
exploration of medical marijuana policy as well as the role of the 
“traditional state interest” principle within the Commerce Clause.  
However, the central focus of this article is not what impact Raich 
may have on the Commerce Clause or our nation’s drug laws, but 
what effect it might have on health care issues. 
We start by briefly examining medical marijuana in Part II: the 
debate over its efficacy, regulatory history, and current trends in 
both cultural and legal spheres.5  We then review the Court’s recent 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, with a focus on the role of the 
 
 1. 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 2909 (U.S. June 28, 
2004) (No. 03-1454). 
 2. See, e.g., Patrick Hoge, 2 Moms who Need Marijuana Await Supreme Court 
Ruling - Forced to Challenge Feds to Keep Their Healing Remedy, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 19, 
2004, at B1. 
 3. See, e.g., Marcus Green, Note, Guns, Drugs, and Federalism: Rethinking 
Commerce-Enabled Regulation of Mere Possession, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2543 (2004). 
 4. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 
2909 (U.S. June 28, 2004) (No. 03-1454). 
 5. See infra Part II. 
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traditional state interest factor in the analysis, and provide an 
overview of Raich.6  In Part IV, we provide a historical look at the 
traditional role of states in regulating health care and compare that 
with the more recent expansion of federal health care regulation.7  
Part V then provides an overview and examples of how the 
traditional state interest issue may impact future health care 
regulation in four different fields.8 
II. MEDICAL MARIJUANA 
In the wake of California’s 1996 medical marijuana ballot 
initiative, the issue has enjoyed a resurgence in mainstream news 
coverage.  Similar ballot initiatives have appeared regularly since 
1996.  In 2004, Montana voters became the latest to pass a medical 
marijuana initiative.9  Although the interest in medical marijuana is 
recent, marijuana has been used as a medicine in the United States 
since at least the middle of the 1800s.10  In parts of Asia and Africa, 
the plant has been used medicinally for thousands of years, to treat 
ailments from malaria to headaches.11 
Today, medical marijuana proponents cite evidence that it is 
effective in treating patients who suffer from a number of 
conditions, including HIV/AIDS, multiple sclerosis, cancer, and 
glaucoma.12  Medical marijuana helps these patients by effectively 
treating pain, nausea and wasting, muscle spasms, and seizures.13  
Because it is nearly impossible for non-government researchers to 
conduct studies of marijuana’s efficacy as a medicine,14 anecdotal 
 
 6. See infra Part III. 
 7. See infra Part IV. 
 8. See infra Part V. 
 9. Medical Marijuana Act, Montana Laws Init. Meas. 148 (2004) (passed 
Nov. 2, 2004, effective Jan. 1, 2005). 
 10. See LESTER GRINSPOON & JAMES B. BAKALAR, MARIHUANA, THE FORBIDDEN 
MEDICINE 4-7 (1997) (discussing the early studies in the United States of marijuana 
as a medicine). 
 11. Id. at 3. 
 12. Brief of The Leukemia & Lymphoma Society, Pain Relief Network, 
California Medical Association, AIDS Action Council, Compassion in Dying 
Federation, End-of-Life Choices, National Women’s Health Network, Global 
Lawyers and Physicians, and Autonomy, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 10-17, Ashcroft v. Raich, 124 S. Ct. 2909 (2004) (No. 03-1454) 
[hereinafter Lymphoma Society Brief]. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See, e.g., Marcella Bombardieri & Jenna Russell, Pot Project Wins Support, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 2, 2003, at A.28 (showing the resolution of a research request 
from a professor at the University of Massachusetts was still unclear despite 
3
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evidence necessarily provides the basis for some of these claims.15  
But, recent comprehensive studies commissioned by the United 
States and the Great Britain House of Lords both support the 
conclusion that marijuana is a useful medicine for at least some 
patients. 
The United States report was commissioned in 1997, largely in 
response to California’s medical marijuana law, and was conducted 
by the National Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of 
Sciences (IOM).16  The resulting year-long study of relevant 
scientific literature, in consultation with experts from a variety of 
fields, gave a qualified recommendation of medical marijuana, 
concluding that “[s]cientific data indicate the potential therapeutic 
value of cannabinoid drugs, primarily THC, for pain relief, control 
of nausea and vomiting, and appetite stimulation.”17  The House of 
Lords study concluded that marijuana had “genuine medical 
applications” in treating similar problems.18  In addition to being 
an effective treatment for a number of conditions, marijuana is a 
relatively safe and “benign” medicine in terms of side effects and 
potential toxicity.19 
Marijuana was widely thought to have value as a medicine even 
when the first anti-marijuana laws were passed.  The American 
Medical Association (AMA) cautioned against passage of the first 
federal regulation of marijuana, the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,20 
because it believed the Act would make impossible research into 
and use of marijuana as a medicine.21  The AMA’s position was not 
 
receiving support from both of Massachusetts’ senators). 
 15. See generally GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 10 (including stories from 
individual patients in addressing the potential benefits of marijuana as a 
medicine). 
 16. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE 
BASE 1 (1999), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309071550/html. 
 17. Id. at 4. 
 18. SELECT COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY NINTH REPORT, CANNABIS: 
THE SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL EVIDENCE (Nov. 4, 1998), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199798/ldselect/ldsctech/151/151
01.htm. 
 19. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 10, at 137-54. 
 20. Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-238, Ch. 553, 50 Stat. 551, 
repealed by Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. 
L. No. 91-513, § 1101, 84 Stat. 1236, 1292. 
 21. See RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD II, THE MARIHUANA 
CONVICTION: A HISTORY OF MARIHUANA PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES 164-73 
(1974) (discussing the congressional testimony of an AMA representative during 
consideration of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937). 
4
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surprising, given that at the time marijuana was included in the 
United States Pharmacopeia, a comprehensive list of medicinal 
substances recognized in the United States.22  The Act 
distinguished between medical and non-medical uses of 
marijuana,23 but the distinction was irrelevant as a practical matter 
because the Act functioned in such a way as to “effectively 
criminaliz[e] the possession of marijuana throughout the United 
States.”24  The Marihuana Tax Act, which was declared 
unconstitutional in 1969,25 had the effect of eliminating any use of 
marijuana as a medicine for thirty years,26 and knowledge of 
marijuana’s value as a medicine slipped from public and 
professional consciousness. 
By 1970, when Congress passed the Controlled Substance Act 
(CSA),27 marijuana was thought of as a symbol of the youth 
counter-culture,28 not a medicine.  The CSA organized drugs by 
Schedule, I-IV: Schedule I substances have a high potential for 
abuse and no accepted medical use, while Schedule IV substances 
have a low potential for abuse, an accepted medical use, and are 
unlikely to cause addiction.29  Marijuana was provisionally placed in 
Schedule I, pending recommendations and findings from a 
Presidential Commission created by the Act.30  The Commission 
ultimately urged that marijuana be decriminalized, with penalties 
removed for all personal marijuana-related activity.31  President 
Nixon rejected the recommendation, leaving marijuana a Schedule 
 
 22. Marijuana was listed in the Pharmacopeia until 1941.  GRINSPOON & 
BAKALAR, supra note 10, at 8. 
 23. Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-238, § 7(a)(2), 50 Stat. at 554. 
 24. ERIC SCHLOSSER, REEFER MADNESS: SEX, DRUGS, AND CHEAPER LABOR IN THE 
AMERICAN BLACK MARKET 20 (2003); see also GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 10, 
at 8 (discussing the difficulties physicians who wished to use medical marijuana in 
treating patients faced under the Act); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) 
(discussing in some detail the structure of the Marihuana Tax Act in the context 
of recreational use of marijuana and holding the Act unconstitutional as violative 
of the Fifth Amendment). 
 25. Leary, 395 U.S. 6. 
 26. BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 21, at 165. 
 27. Controlled Substance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 801-904) (2000). 
 28. See DAN BAUM, SMOKE AND MIRRORS: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND THE POLITICS 
OF FAILURE 7-8 (1997) (discussing marijuana as a symbol of the counter-culture). 
The CSA passed in a politically charged atmosphere as part of President Nixon’s 
effort to crack down on crime and lawlessness.  Id. at 13-17. 
 29. BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 21, at 245. 
 30. Id. at 246-47. 
 31. Id. at 270. 
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I drug.32 
Independent of the increased federal effort against drug use, 
the idea of marijuana as a medicine began to gain traction again in 
the mid-1960s and early 1970s as the increase in recreational use 
led some users to accidentally stumble upon marijuana’s medicinal 
value.33  At the same time, marijuana reform activists began to seize 
on the prohibition of medicinal use of marijuana as an example of 
the excesses of the drug war.34  In the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
the new interest in medical marijuana translated into passage of 
medical marijuana laws in thirty-three states.35  These early medical 
marijuana laws were quite different from the recent efforts: instead 
of expressly permitting medical marijuana use and distribution 
under state law in violation of the CSA, most established programs 
allow use only when approved by the federal government as part of 
the FDA’s Investigative New Drug (IND) program.36  INDs were 
generally used by pharmaceutical companies for research projects 
but, due to pressure from medical marijuana patients, the federal 
government allowed limited medical marijuana use under a 
“Compassionate IND” program.37 
The Compassionate IND program stopped permitting new 
applications in 1992 with thirteen qualified patients.38  Those 
patients were grandfathered in and the remaining patients still 
receive medical marijuana from the federal government, but the 
end of the program signaled to activists that medical marijuana 
efforts at the federal level had hit a wall.39  In 1996, modern state 
 
 32. Id. at 273. 
 33. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 10, at 13. 
 34. See, e.g., PATRICK ANDERSON, HIGH IN AMERICA: THE TRUE STORY BEHIND 
NORML AND THE POLITICS OF MARIJUANA, 236-248 (1981) (discussing medical 
marijuana patients involvement in the marijuana law reform movement). 
 35. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 10, at 17. 
 36. See Nicole Dogwill, Comment, The Burning Question: How Will the United 
States Deal with the Medical-Marijuana Debate?, 1998 DET. C.L. REV. 247, 256-67 
(1997). 
 37. See generally ROBERT C. RANDALL & ALICE M. O’LEARY, MARIJUANA RX: THE 
PATIENTS’ FIGHT FOR MEDICINAL POT 104-12 (1998) (discussing the origins of the 
Compassionate IND program). 
 38. See GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 10, at 20-23. 
 39. An unsuccessful twenty-two year-long effort to have marijuana 
rescheduled through an administrative rule-making procedure also contributed to 
the belief among medical marijuana activists that they should turn their attention 
to the states.  See Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 15 F.3d 1131 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994) (denying a petition for review of the Administrator’s final order 
maintaining classification of marijuana as narcotic drug under Schedule I). 
6
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law medical marijuana reform efforts began with the passage of 
Proposition 215, California’s Compassionate Use Act,40 and a 
similar ballot initiative in Arizona.41 
Although a total of eleven states have passed medical 
marijuana laws since 1996,42 California’s law has been at the center 
of most of the medical marijuana-related publicity and legal 
activity, in part because of the structure of California’s law and in 
part because local officials have been so direct in embracing and 
assisting patients who use marijuana.  In addition to permitting use 
and possession of marijuana by qualified patients, California’s law 
allows designated caregivers to grow marijuana for patients.43  
Although California state courts have held that this provision does 
not allow for operation of medical marijuana dispensaries,44 custom 
and support from state and local officials have allowed such 
businesses and non-profit collectives to operate legally and openly 
under state law.45 
Many California cities have gone further than tacit approval of 
medical marijuana dispensaries to outright and vocal support.  In 
Santa Cruz, for example, city officials organized an event to 
distribute marijuana on the steps of city hall in response to a DEA 
raid of a local medical marijuana hospice in September 2002.46  
Oakland has implemented a system to officially approve and 
regulate its medical marijuana clubs after a large number of clubs 
sprang up in an area of downtown Oakland that many began 
referring to it as “Oaksterdam” in reference to Amsterdam, where 
 
 40. Compassionate Use Act of 1996 § 1, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 
11362.5 (West Supp. 2003). 
 41. See Elvia Diaz, Medical Marijuana Debate Flares, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 20, 
2002, at 7B (discussing the Arizona measure and the state legislature’s subsequent 
efforts to repeal it). 
 42. See National Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws, State by State 
Laws, at http://www.norml.org/index.cfm?Group_ID=4516 (last visited Feb. 12, 
2005) (Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Montana, 
Nevada, Oregon, and Washington). 
 43. Compassionate Use Act of 1996 § 1, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 
11362.5(d). 
 44. People ex rel. Lungren v. Peron, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20, 31 (Ct. App. 1997). 
 45. See, e.g., Jason Hoppin, Pot Clubs Find a New Venue, THE RECORDER, June 7, 
2002, at 1 (noting that San Francisco Supervisor Mark Leno urged local law 
enforcement officials not to cooperate with federal law enforcement agencies 
enforcing federal drug laws). 
 46. Maria Alicia Gaura & Matthew B. Stannard, Santa Cruz Officials to Defy Feds, 
Hand out Medical Pot at City Hall, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 13, 2002 at A23. 
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marijuana is legal.47 
The city of Oakland also supported the Oakland Cannabis 
Buyer’s Cooperative (OCBC) as it litigated the first medical 
marijuana case to reach the Supreme Court.  When the federal 
government first sought to close OCBC down, Oakland declared a 
city-wide health emergency in response.48  The government 
attempted to shut down OCBC by requesting an injunction from a 
United States District Court, which subsequently granted the 
motion.49  The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that a medical 
necessity defense would likely apply to protect OCBC’s activity.50  
The Supreme Court, however, reversed and held that medical 
necessity was not a valid defense to the manufacture and 
distribution of marijuana.51  The Court explicitly reserved the issue 
of “whether the Controlled Substances Act exceeds Congress’ 
power under the Commerce Clause.”52 
A. State Interest and the Commerce Clause 
The Ninth Circuit reached its decision in Raich because of two 
Supreme Court cases that fundamentally changed Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence: United States v. Lopez53 and United States v. 
Morrison.54  The last time the Supreme Court held a federal action 
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause before Lopez, was 
1936.55  At the time, a majority of the Court adhered to a restrictive 
approach focused on whether an activity had “direct” or “indirect” 
effects on interstate commerce.56  Under the “direct-indirect” test, 
the Court struck down a number of important pieces of President 
Roosevelt’s New Deal.  Roosevelt considered the issue so 
problematic that he threatened a court-packing plan to gain a 
 
 47. See, e.g., Henry K. Lee, OAKLAND, Closed Pot Club Sues City, Council Broke 
up Cluster of Clubs in “Oaksterdam,” S.F. CHRON., Aug. 25, 2004, at B5. 
 48. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 190 F.3d 1109, 1114 
(9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), rev’d, 532 U.S. 483 (2001). 
 49. United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1106 (N.C. 
Cal. 1998). 
 50. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 190 F.3d at 1114. 
 51. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 493 
(2001). 
 52. Id. at 495 n.7. 
 53. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 54. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 55. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
 56. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 548-
49 (1935). 
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majority of Justices who believed the Constitution permitted a 
broader federal regulatory power.57 
In this setting, the Supreme Court dramatically changed 
course in 1937 and again in 1942.  Although the 1937 case, NLRB v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,58 marked the shift, the 1942 case, 
Wickard v. Filburn,59 famously demonstrated the extent to which the 
Court would allow Congress to regulate activity under the 
Commerce Clause.  In Wickard, the Court allowed the regulation of 
a wheat farmer who exceeded his acreage allotment for personal 
uses under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which aimed 
to stabilize the price of wheat.60  The Court reasoned that although 
the wheat farmer’s individual impact on commerce was 
insignificant, the effect of all such farmers’ level of growth was 
dramatic in the aggregate.61  The aggregation principle seemed so 
sweeping that most regarded commerce power limits as 
nonexistent.62 
Both Lopez and Morrison, by a five Justice majority, placed new 
constraints on congressional commerce power by holding 
respectively unconstitutional a law that criminalized gun possession 
in a school zone and a law that provided a private cause of action 
under federal law for victims of gender-motivated violent acts.63  
Together, these two cases announced a new framework for 
analyzing Commerce Clause challenges based on “three broad 
categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its 
commerce power:”64 “the use of the channels of interstate 
commerce,” “the instrumentalities of interstate commerce,” and 
“those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”65  
Lopez, Morrison, and most subsequent lower court cases, including 
 
 57. See generally Alpheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone and FDR’s Court 
Plan, 61 YALE L.J. 791 (1952) (discussing the court-packing plan). 
 58. 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (holding congressional power to regulate under the 
Commerce Clause extends to labor relations). 
 59. 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding commerce power extends to intrastate 
farming activities). 
 60. Id. at 114. 
 61. Id. at 127-28 (consuming homegrown wheat causes variable factor in 
maintenance of government regulation of commodity). 
 62. See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 691 
(1995) (referring to the Court’s pre-Lopez approach to the Commerce Clause as an 
“intellectual joke”). 
 63. 514 U.S. at 549; 529 U.S. at 598. 
 64. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. 
 65. Id. at 558-59. 
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Raich, have involved the substantial effects category, which covers 
activity that may technically be intrastate but nonetheless has a 
substantial impact on interstate commerce.66  In Lopez, the Court 
identified Wickard as an example of a case that pushed the limits of 
the substantial effects category.67 
The central consideration in determining the constitutionality 
of a regulation or governmental action within the substantial 
effects category is whether the activity regulated is commercial 
(economic) or noncommercial (noneconomic) in nature.68  This 
was the primary basis that the Court used to distinguish Wickard 
from Lopez.  The Court argued that the Gun Free School Zones Act 
(GFSZA) at issue in Lopez was not a proper exercise of Congress’ 
commerce power because the Act “by its terms has nothing to do 
with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however 
broadly one might define those terms.”69  In Morrison, the Court 
went on to establish a controlling four-factor test.70  In addition to 
the commercial factor, the test considers whether the effect of the 
activity on commerce is attenuated; whether the statute contains an 
express jurisdictional element that limits its reach; and whether 
there are any Congressional findings on the relationship between 
the activity and interstate commerce contained in the statute or its 
legislative history.71 
Although Morrison’s four-factor test is indisputably the proper 
method for resolving challenges to congressional commerce power, 
it is also deceptively simple in glossing over some of the 
fundamental problems the Court left unanswered in Lopez and 
Morrison.  For example, the test does not account for the “broader 
regulatory scheme” doctrine mentioned in Lopez72 and is neutral on 
 
 66. See id. at 558-59 (providing an overview of the three categories of activity). 
 67. Id. at 559-60 (discussing Wickard, Hodel, McClung, and Heart of Atlanta 
Motel as examples “[w]here economic activity substantially affects interstate 
commerce”). 
 68. Id. at 559-61. 
 69. Id. at 561. 
 70. 529 U.S. at 598. 
 71. Id. at 610-12. 
 72. See Adrian Vermeule, Does Commerce Clause Review Have Perverse Effects?, 46 
VILL. L. REV. 1325 (2001) (arguing that the broader scheme doctrine may create 
perverse incentives for Congress to regulate more, not less, broadly); Alex Kreit, 
Why is Congress Still Regulating Noncommercial Activity?, 28 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
169 (2004) (noting that the Court left unresolved the meaning of the broader 
scheme doctrine in Lopez and Morrison and proposing an interpretation of it based 
on the enterprise concept). 
10
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even the most fundamental question of whether as-applied 
Commerce Clause challenges are allowed at all.73  Similarly, the 
four-factor test does not directly account for perhaps the most 
important guiding principle in both Lopez and Morrison: federal 
encroachment on “traditional state interests.”74  For our purposes, 
the potential for Raich to impact health care law lies in the 
“traditional state interest” consideration.75  In addition to issues 
strictly related to Commerce Clause jurisprudence, such as how the 
traditional state interest analysis relates to the Morrison test, Raich 
presents the Court with questions about the extent to which health 
care is a traditional state interest and what that classification may 
mean as a practical matter. 
In Lopez, the majority explained that when Congress 
improperly expands its commerce power, “it effects a ‘change in 
the sensitive relation between federal and state criminal 
jurisdiction.’”76  The Court reasoned that limiting Congress’ 
commerce power was necessary to preserve this relationship.  
“Under the theories that the Government presents in support of 
[finding the GFSZA constitutional], it is difficult to perceive any 
limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law 
enforcement or education where States historically have been 
sovereign.”77  Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Lopez relied 
even more vigorously on federalism concerns.78  Kennedy argued 
that because the GFSZA concerned schools, which traditionally 
were a matter for local control, the Court had “a particular duty to 
ensure that the federal-state balance is not destroyed.”79  Indeed, 
Justice Kennedy appears to view federalism as the central 
consideration in Commerce Clause cases: “we must inquire 
 
 73. Compare United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(Trott, J. dissenting) (concluding that the majority should not have the option of 
declaring a statute invalid “as applied”) with United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 
1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2003) (debating whether there can be successful as-applied 
Commerce Clause challenges or only facial challenges). 
 74. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Misguided Federalism, 68 MO. L. REV. 389, 391 
(2003) (discussing Lopez and Morrison as cases in which the Court used “federalism 
as an independent limitation on congressional power to legislate in areas that 
infringe on state sovereignty” but arguing against as-applied commerce 
challenges). 
 75. See Part III infra. 
 76. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 n.3 (quoting United States v. Emmons, 410 U.S. 
396, 411-12 (1973)). 
 77. Id. at 564. 
 78. Id. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 79. Id. at 581. 
11
Kreit and Marcus: Raich, Health Care, and the Commerce Clause
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005
7KREITMARCUS.DOC 3/13/2005  4:08:28 PM 
968 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:3 
whether the exercise of national power seeks to intrude upon an 
area of traditional state concern . . . .  [The GFSZA] forecloses the 
States from experimenting and exercising their own judgment in 
an area to which States lay claim by right of history and expertise.”80 
In Morrison, the Court emphasized similar themes to explain its 
decision.  In striking down part of the Violence Against Women Act 
(VAWA), the Court stated that “we can think of no better example 
of the police power, which the Founders denied the National 
Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of 
violent crime and vindication of its victims.”81  The Morrison 
majority argued that allowing regulation of this sort of local activity 
was improper because “[t]he Constitution requires a distinction 
between what is truly national and what is truly local . . . .  [This 
would permit regulation of] family law and other areas of 
traditional state regulation since the aggregate effect of marriage, 
divorce, and childrearing on the national economy is undoubtedly 
significant.”82 
The idea of protecting traditional state authority from federal 
intrusion in the context of Lopez and Morrison has its roots in some 
of the Court’s Tenth Amendment cases decided in between the 
1960s and 1980s, while the Court’s Commerce Clause approach 
remained broadly permissive.  The legal theory at issue in these 
cases was that the Tenth Amendment acted as an affirmative 
protection against federal regulation of state-run entities under the 
Commerce Clause.  The theory was adopted only briefly in National 
League of Cities v. Usery83 after being first explored in Justice 
Douglas’ dissenting opinion in Maryland v. Wirtz.84  Under this 
theory, States were protected from the increasingly expansive scope 
of federal power by preventing the enforcement of otherwise 
constitutional regulations against state-run entities.  As Usery 
explained, “the dispositive factor is that Congress has attempted to 
exercise its Commerce Clause authority to prescribe minimum 
wages and maximum hours to be paid by the States in their 
 
 80. Id. at 580, 583. 
 81. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618. 
 82. Id. at 617-18, 615-16. 
 83. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit 
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 84. 392 U.S. 183, 201-05 (1968), overruled by Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 
426 US. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth. 469 
U.S. 528 (1985). 
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capacities as sovereign governments.”85  The Court abandoned this 
reading of the Tenth Amendment just ten years after Usery,86 but 
the principle informs the Court’s focus on traditional state 
authority in its new Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 
Importantly, while Lopez and Morrison draw from themes in the 
Tenth Amendment cases, the question of state authority functions 
quite differently in each setting.  In the Tenth Amendment cases, it 
was used to provide certain state action immunity from otherwise 
valid federal regulation under the Commerce Clause.  In the new 
Commerce Clause analysis, it affects the validity of the regulation 
itself, whether applied to a state actor or private individuals.  At the 
same time, however, Lopez and Morrison do not carve out separate 
spheres of federal and state authority.87 
While Lopez and Morrison noted that education and criminal 
law were traditional state interests as important considerations, 
their holdings certainly do not prevent the federal government 
entirely, or even largely, from regulating in those areas.  This 
much, however, is clear: Lopez and Morrison both relied heavily on 
the traditional role of states to support their conclusions, though 
both left the counters of the traditional state interest inquiry largely 
undefined.  Neither case specifies what role the factor should play 
in analyzing Commerce Clause cases even as both demonstrate it 
was important to the Court’s decisions.88  More fundamentally, 
neither case explains what a traditional state interest is.  Perhaps 
the best indication of the role the concern might play comes in the 
idea expressed in Justice Kennedy’s Lopez concurrence that 
protecting traditional state authority is especially important when 
failing to do so would foreclose experimentation by the states.89  
Nevertheless, the precise role the traditional state interest will play 
in Commerce Clause analysis generally, and in Raich specifically, 
remains unclear in many key ways.  At the same time, it is the 
doctrinal mechanism that lies in the middle of the relationship 
between Raich and broader health care issues. 
 
 85. Usery, 426 U.S. at 852. 
 86. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 87. See Part III infra (exploring how authority in health care law is 
overlapping). 
 88. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 599. 
 89. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568. 
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B. Ashcroft v. Raich 
Raich marks the second time in four years that the Supreme 
Court is faced with the issue of medical marijuana.90  Raich comes to 
the Court on appeal from a 2-1 Ninth Circuit decision holding that 
the CSA is likely unconstitutional as applied to “the intrastate, 
noncommercial cultivation, possession and use of marijuana for 
personal medical purposes on the advice of a physician and in 
accordance with state law.”91 
The case arose in August 2002 when the DEA sent agents to 
the home of Diane Monson.92  They were accompanied by 
members of the Butte County Sheriffs Department and the local 
district attorney.93  Talks between the authorities and Monson 
lasted three hours before the DEA proceeded to tear down the six 
marijuana plants growing in her house.94  Monson had been using 
marijuana upon the recommendation of her doctor to help treat a 
number of chronic illnesses.95  After the raid, Monson became 
concerned she would not be able to obtain the strain of marijuana 
that best treated her pains.96 
She soon located Angel McClary Raich, one of the fourteen 
medical marijuana patients represented by the OCBC in United 
States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative.97  Raich has used 
medicinal cannabis since 1997 for eating, muscle, and nervous 
system disorders.98  Unlike Monson, Raich was not able to grow her 
 
 90. In 2001, the Supreme Court found the Controlled Substance Act did not 
permit a medical necessity defense to marijuana possession.  United States v. 
Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Co-op, 532 U.S. 483, 495 (2001).  In 2003, the Court let 
stand a Ninth Circuit ruling that physicians have a First Amendment right to 
recommend marijuana to their patients.  Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 
2002), cert. denied 72 U.S.L.W. 3092 (Oct. 14, 2003) (No. 03-40). 
 91. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 92. See Decl. of Diane Monson in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj., at 4 
[hereinafter Monson Decl.], Raich v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918 (N.D. Cal. 
2003) (No. 02-4872 EMC), available at http://raich-v-
ashcroft.com/raichashdiane.pdf.  None of the facts of the case are disputed by 
either party.  See Raich, 352 F.3d at 1225-26. 
 93. Monson Decl., supra note 92, at 4. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 3-4. 
 96. Id. at 4. 
 97. See generally 532 U.S. 483.  See also Decl. of Angel McClary Raich in Supp. 
of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 18-19 [hereinafter Raich Decl.], Raich v. Ashcroft, 248 F. 
Supp. 2d 918 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (No. C 02-4872 EMC), available at 
http://www.angeljustice.org/downloads/raichashangel.pdf. 
 98. See Raich Decl., supra note 97, at 1-17. 
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own marijuana.99  In 1998 she became a member of the Oakland 
Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative.100  When the Cooperative lost its 
case in the Supreme Court, Raich had to find alternative sources.101  
She found two suppliers who generously agreed to provide her 
marijuana free of charge.102 
Raich, Monson, and the two suppliers, who remain anonymous 
to protect Raich’s medical supply, brought suit in the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California.  They sought 
a declaratory judgment that the CSA is unconstitutional as applied 
to patients using non-purchased intrastate marijuana103 under 
California’s Compassionate Use Act.104  They also sought a 
preliminary injunction to prevent the federal government from 
seizing or destroying their cannabis, or from prosecuting for the 
use or production of marijuana for the duration of the case.105 
In addition to their Commerce Clause argument, Raich and 
Monson made arguments based on the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth 
Amendments,106 but the Ninth Circuit did not reach any of these 
issues.107  The District Court found it was unlikely the plaintiffs 
would succeed on the merits and refused to issue an injunction.108  
It found dispositive the Ninth Circuit’s previous rulings that the 
CSA was a permissible exercise of Commerce Clause authority.109  
The District Court relied on two Ninth Circuit decisions that 
rejected Commerce Clause challenges by defendants whom were 
charged with marijuana possession and distribution offenses.110 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Visman and Tisor, 
 
 99. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 100. Raich Decl., supra note 97, at 18. 
 101. Id. at 19. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Raich, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 922-26. 
 104. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5. 
 105. Complaint at 12-13, Raich v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918 (N.D. Cal. 
2003) (No. 02-4872 EMC), available at http://raich-v-ashcroft.com/ 
raichashcmp.pdf. 
 106. Plaintiffs’ Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 6-24, Raich v. 
Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (No. 02-4872 EMC), available at 
http://raich-v-ashcroft.com/raichashmem.pdf. 
 107. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1227.  Although interesting arguments, it is beyond the 
scope of this article to deal with the other constitutional challenges.  The crux of 
the case relates to the Commerce Clause challenge, and the Ninth Circuit ruled 
only upon this issue.  Id. 
 108. Raich, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 931. 
 109. Id. at 923-26. 
 110. Id. at 924-25 (citing United States v. Tisor, 96 F.3d 370 (9th Cir. 1996); 
United States v. Visman, 919 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
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the two cases relied upon by the district court, on the grounds that 
they involved non-medical commercial activity.111  The court noted 
that in order to properly conduct analysis under the Commerce 
Clause, the class of activities must be defined.112  The class of 
activities associated with Visman and Tisor was drug trafficking, not 
intrastate non-commercial medical use.113  The Ninth Circuit 
concluded that drug trafficking is an economic enterprise relating 
directly to the CSA’s regulatory purpose of controlling the 
commercial marijuana market.114  In contrast, the court held that 
the intrastate non-commercial production and personal use of 
marijuana upon a doctor’s recommendation, and in connection 
with state law, is not a market-based activity.115  Thus, the court 
stated “concern regarding users’ health and safety is significantly 
different in the medicinal marijuana context, where the use is 
pursuant to a physician’s recommendation.”116  After making this 
distinction, the court then analyzed the activity under the four-
factor Morrison test.117 
The Ninth Circuit found that the personal production, 
possession, and use of medicinal marijuana were not economic 
activity under Morrison’s first prong.118  Citing Black’s Law 
Dictionary, the court reasoned that “[l]acking sale, exchange or 
distribution, the activity does not possess the essential elements of 
commerce.”119  The Justice Department argued even if true, 
Wickard’s aggregation principle permitted federal involvement.120  
The court found Wickard inapplicable because, based on Lopez and 
Morrison, aggregation only applies to activities that are economic in 
character.121  The majority continued to examine the other three 
factors and concluded that the attenuated effects and jurisdictional 
hook factors weighed in favor of the plaintiffs, and that the 
legislative history favored the government.122 
 
 111. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1227-28. 
 112. Id. at 1228. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See id. at 1230. 
 115. Id. at 1228, 1231. 
 116. Id. at 1230. 
 117. Id. at 1229-30. 
 118. Id. at 1229. 
 119. Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) (“commerce”)). 
 120. See id. at 1230. 
 121. Id. at 1230 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610-11 n.4 
(2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995)). 
 122. Id. at 1231-35. 
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In dissent, Judge Beam first argued that the plaintiffs lacked 
standing to bring the suit.123  He argued that plaintiffs had made no 
showing whatsoever that they had particular reason to fear that 
federal prosecution or some other adverse action would be against 
them.124  Beam’s central disagreement over substance with the 
majority concerned its decision to classify the activity at issue so 
narrowly.125  He compared the case to Wickard and argued the 
majority’s classification was indefensible because the activity 
involved in Wickard could have been described as “the intrastate, 
noncommercial cultivation of wheat for personal food purposes.”126 
Although the majority and dissent did not disagree specifically 
about the traditional state interest factor,127 the issue was intimately 
related to definition of the class of activity each side chose to 
adopt.128  The potential for Raich to influence other areas of health 
care law also lies in this question.  Raich will primarily influence 
general Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but the Court’s 
treatment of the traditional state interest factor in resolving the 
constitutional question will also affect the relationship between 
states and the federal government in regulating health care. 
 
III. PUBLIC HEALTH AS A TRADITIONAL STATE CONCERN 
 
A. Public Health and Its Boundaries 
 
Chief Justice Marshall announced in Gibbons v. Ogden129 that a 
state’s police power encompasses the ability to enact “health laws of 
every description.”130  Eighty years after Gibbons, the Supreme Court 
again declared that a state has always retained authority to make 
regulations that “protect the public health and safety.”131  The 
Court has continuously repeated this pronouncement.132  It has 
 
 123. Id. at 1236 (Beam, J., dissenting). 
 124. Id. at 1237. 
 125. See id. at 1238-39. 
 126. Id. at 1238. 
 127. See id. at 1238-39. 
 128. See id.  The court did not address this relationship directly, but 
California’s adoption of a medically oriented statute provided the basis for 
narrowly classifying the activity.  On the other hand, a broader classification of the 
activity would downplay state regulation. 
 129. 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
 130. Id. at 203 (Chief Justice Marshall announcing the decision of the case). 
 131. Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (citations omitted). 
 132. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296 (2000) (regarding a 
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even stated “a State’s power to regulate . . . for the purpose of 
protecting the health of its citizens . . . is at the core of its police 
power.”133  Despite this powerful rhetoric, the Court has never 
clarified what the public health police power entails.  The 
expansion of federal regulation in the field of health care since the 
beginning of the 1900s makes it even more difficult to discern the 
extent to which health care is a subject for state regulation.  It is 
necessary to closely inspect the origins of health care as a concern 
for the state and recent federal involvement to understand the 
issues the Supreme Court will face as it decides how to classify the 
activity engaged in by the Raich plaintiffs. 
B. Public Health and Health Care 
The term “public health” is a broad classification of activities 
dealing with personal and societal health.  The World Health 
Organization has defined achieving public health as “a state of 
complete physical, mental, and social well being . . . .”134  The 
Institute of Medicine has an equally broad definition: “fulfilling 
society’s interest in assuring conditions where people can be 
healthy.”135  Despite their breadth, both statements seem accurate 
in identifying the broad swath cut by public health issues.  These 
statements are more esoteric than practical.  If these definitions 
guided public health practices, “the health department ought to be 
the biggest state agency.”136 
We can find assistance in narrowing the topic by examining 
what modern functions are generally within the purview of public 
health agencies.  These include the control and elimination of 
 
city’s inherent police powers); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 
(1991) (upholding Indiana’s public nudity ban); City of Newport v. Iacobucci, 479 
U.S. 92, 95 (1986) (citing California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114 (1972)) 
(interpreting the Twenty-First Amendment); Head v. New Mex. Bd. of Exam’rs in 
Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 428 (1963) (stating, “the statute here involved is a 
measure directly addressed to protection of the public health, and the statute thus 
falls within the most traditional concept of what is compendiously known as the 
police power.”). 
 133. Sporhase v. Neb., ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982). 
 134. WORLD HEALTH ORG., BASIC DOCS. 1 (41st ed. 1996). 
 135. COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH, INSTITUTE OF 
MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 7 (1988) [hereinafter FUTURE OF PUBLIC 
HEALTH]. 
 136. Lawrence O Gostin, Scott Burris & Zita Lazzarini, The Law and the Public’s 
Health: A Study of Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 59, 69 
(1999) (defining public health). 
18
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss3/7
7KREITMARCUS.DOC 3/13/2005  4:08:28 PM 
2005] RAICH, HEALTH CARE, COMMERCE CLAUSE 975 
diseases and illness;137 sewage and garbage removal;138 quarantine;139 
water filtration, fluoridification, and treatment;140 licensing of 
medical professionals;141 disclosure of medical information;142 
pollution prevention;143 health education;144 vaccinations;145 
inspections of private and commercial buildings;146 and regulation 
of food and drugs.147 
Public health agencies may have the authority to reach only 
one or all of these issues.148  Other matters that play important 
public health roles such as environmental regulation, policing and 
crime control, poverty reduction, and labor protections are 
typically resigned to other local, state, and federal agencies that 
rarely or poorly coordinate with health officials.149  Occasionally, 
the lack of a coherent definition of public health has resulted in an 
inability to deal effectively with large-scale problems that affect 
social well-being.150 
Although public health encompasses a wide range of activities 
and regulations, a great deal of it is outside the more particular 
area of health care and closely related practices.  By “health care,” 
we refer to the region of public health that relates to the practice 
and development of medicine.  Under our definition, health care is 
 
 137. See 39 AM. JUR. 2D Health § 52 (2004). 
 138. See id. § 49. 
 139. See id. §§ 59-64. 
 140. See id. § 49; 78 AM. JUR. 2D Waterworks and Water Companies §§ 31-39. 
 141. See 39 AM. JUR. 2D Health § 80 (2004). 
 142. See id. § 83. 
 143. See id. § 49; 61A AM. JUR. 2D Pollution Control § 50 (2004). 
 144. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 247c (2004) (providing authorization for federal 
funding of STD education and prevention programs); MINN. STAT. § 144.05, subd. 
1(e) (2004) (providing that the state Department of Health “[p]romote personal 
health by conducting general health education programs and disseminating 
health information”). 
 145. See 39 AM. JUR. 2D Health §§ 65-69 (2004). 
 146. See id. §§ 70-79 (2004). 
 147. See id. § 49. 
 148. See FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 135, at 81-83. 
 149. See id. at Appendix A (describing organization of defined public health 
agencies).  What is not included in this assessment warrants attention.  The 
Department of Justice, Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department of 
Labor are conspicuously missing despite the reach over various medical and public 
health activities.  See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.1-1910.1018 (2004) (setting out 
occupational health and safety standards for the Department of Labor).  States 
likewise divide resources and oversight between similar agencies.  See, e.g., MINN. 
STAT. §§ 116.1-116.115 (2004) (establishing a pollution control agency separate 
from state health agencies). 
 150. FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 135, at 81-83. 
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the process by which the medical profession is able to directly act to 
benefit public well-being.  These activities relate to the physical 
involvement of doctors in directing and implementing personal 
care and healthy living.  This excludes such issues as crime control, 
broad environmental concerns, and poverty reduction.  With this 
in mind, we identify six categories of traditional state health care 
practices: (1) regulation of the practice of medicine through 
licensing;151 (2) containment, treatment and elimination of disease 
including sanitation, inoculation, and quarantine;152 (3) care for 
the mentally ill;153 (4) health education;154 (5) vital statistics;155 (6) 
and medical research.156  These categories may not be exclusive and 
a thorough examination of each is not necessary to understanding 
the traditional control of health care by the states, but they provide 
a sufficient basis to categorize most current activities quickly.  The 
information to be gleaned from a historical summary is not what 
specific activities states have historically carried out, but rather the 
broad fundamental purposes behind these actions.  Answering 
these questions provides a basis for applying federalism principles 
to current hot button issues. 
 
C. A History of State Medical Regulation 
 
1. Colonial America 
 
In the early years of the colonies, private or religious groups, 
not community governments, often performed public services. 157  
Health care, however, was very different.  William Penn, while 
looking for land for what was to become Philadelphia, wanted a 
 
 151. See 39 AM. JUR. 2D Health § 80 (2004). 
 152. See id. § 52. 
 153. See id. §§ 106-08. 
 154. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 144.055, subd. 1 (2004) (authorizing the 
commissioner of health to develop and conduct health education programs). 
 155. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 144.213, subd. 1 (2004) (authorizing the 
commissioner of health to maintain vital statistics). 
 156. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 247c (2004) (providing authorization for federal 
funding of STD education and prevention programs); MINN. STAT. § 144.05, subd. 
1(e) (2004) (providing that the state Department of Health “[p]romote personal 
health by conducting general health education programs and disseminating 
health information.”). 
 157. See Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and the 
Role of the State in the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 267, 285-86 (1993) 
(discussing public health practices in the colonial and federalist periods). 
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location that was “navigable, high, dry, and healthy.”158  He was 
intimately concerned with the plague and fires that decimated 
London and wanted a town consisting of widely spread lots so 
contamination and fire could not easily ravage the city.159  Penn 
would have been disappointed to learn few public health 
regulations were adopted in early Philadelphia, but the northern 
cities quickly developed mechanisms to deal with sickness.160 
Like Penn, many early settlers came to North America 
believing that the public health was a governmental function.161  
Disease was common and communities quickly responded.162  With 
little medical knowledge, settlers implemented policies that had 
been used in Europe for hundreds of years.163  Many of these 
practices arose during Europe’s constant battle with the black 
plague.164  Those responsible for implementing health care polices 
shared no common backgrounds.  Often, barber-surgeons, 
religious leaders, or community officials implemented health care 
measures.165 
In New Amsterdam, which would become New York, no 
trained surgeons accompanied the first settlers.166  When the first 
surgeon with a medical degree arrived, the Governor was notified 
and he soon became a member of the Council.167  He was even 
 
 158. JOSEPH E. ILLICK, COLONIAL PENNSYLVANIA: A HISTORY 30 (1976) (quoting 
William Penn). 
 159. Id.  Penn was likely more concerned with potential fires than with disease.  
His original plan called for the distribution of large plots of land so no house or 
building would be close to another, thereby avoiding the spread of fire.  Id. 
 160. See generally JOHN B. BLAKE, PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE TOWN OF BOSTON 1630-
1822 3, 5-7 (1959) (stating how Boston settlers first relied upon other aspects of 
society in addition to medical knowledge and beliefs in response to sickness, and 
realizing they needed to train their own physicians); JOHN DUFFY, A HISTORY OF 
PUBLIC HEALTH IN NEW YORK CITY 1625-1866 7-10 (1968) (stating New York 
implemented an ordinance directed at immoderate drinking, and another action 
intended to keep the area clean). 
 161. See Parmet, supra note 157, at 286. 
 162. See BLAKE, supra note 160, at 3-7 (stating settlers “frequently held fast days . 
. . because of sickness,” and the President of Harvard requested funding for 
medical books to help provide an educational basis for medical training). 
 163. See generally id. at 8 (noting that many early medical practitioners learned 
via an “apprenticeship system” modeled after the teaching method used in 
England). 
 164. See generally Katherine Park, Medicine and the Renaissance, in WESTERN 
MEDICINE: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY 66-79 (Irvine Loudon, ed., 1997); BERNHARD J. 
STERN, SOCIETY AND MEDICAL PROGRESS 21-24 (1941). 
 165. DUFFY, supra note 160, at 8-9. 
 166. Id. at 7. 
 167. Id. at 9 (Dr. Johannes La Montagne, New York’s first physician, arrived in 
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responsible for making exceptions to a City Council edict granting 
barber-surgeons the exclusive rights to practice their trade, making 
it possibly the first medical licensing rule in the colonies.168  Boston 
attempted to institute “licensing” in 1649, but had no method of 
enforcement.169 
Licensing was, at least in part, an attempt to assure the public 
of quality care when very few people were well trained.170  As the 
early New York experience shows, the partnership between medical 
practitioners and public officials was an early and essential 
development in state health administration.171  Officials would rely 
on the advice of privately trained doctors and back their educated 
opinions with the force of law.172 
Licensing constituted only one of several key health care 
policies developed in early America.  Most colonists understood the 
need to be proactive in preventing illness.  By the turn of the 
eighteenth century, much of the hold religious institutions had 
over Boston’s government affairs had diminished.173  This allowed 
health conscious citizens to advocate their causes to city leaders.174  
The shift significantly altered the role of the medical community.175  
Instead of religious doctrines guiding the course of health care 
practices, the direct connection with city leaders permitted a more 
secular and scientific approach.176 
Responding to this advice, Boston’s selectmen and General 
Court imposed sanitary restrictions on butchers, distillers, and 
others to prevent decay and nuisances from invading the city 
streets.177  It also experimented with street cleaning and waste 
regulations, mostly to keep city streets free of filth.178  Boston also 
successfully adopted a standard port quarantine process requiring 
 
1637). 
 168. Id. 
 169. See BLAKE, supra note 160, at 9 (stating that “the General Court in 1649 
required surgeons, physicians, and midwives to do nothing contrary to the known 
approved rules of their art . . . but provided no means of execution”). 
 170. See id.; see also DUFFY, supra note 160, at 9, 33-34. 
 171. See BLAKE, supra note 160, at 9. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 23-26; see JAMES F. COOPER, JR., TENACIOUS OF THEIR LIBERTIES: THE 
CONGREGATIONALISTS IN COLONIAL MASSACHUSETTS 11-14 (1999) (discussing the 
early role churches played in controlling Massachusetts politics). 
 174. See BLAKE, supra note 160, at 23-24. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See id. 
 177. Id. at 29. 
 178. Id. at 30-31. 
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interrogations of all incoming ships; if any crew member was sick or 
if its departure point was experiencing an epidemic, no crew would 
be let ashore.179 
In the late seventeenth century New Amsterdam fell under 
English rule and became New York.180  The city’s Council passed a 
law in 1693 that permitted a tax on residents for cleansing and 
paving the streets, although it was not truly effective.181  The city 
also passed laws to prevent the roaming of hogs and cattle which 
“‘cause[d] great stench and filth within this City,’ help[ed] to 
infect the streets, and thus engender[ed] serious sickness.”182  
These first sanitation laws reflected a commitment on the part of 
local officials proactively to involve themselves in public health.183  
The state of medicine was such that one of the few agreed upon 
principles was that filth and putrescence brought disease.184  If filth 
was a disease-causing agent, it was the city’s responsibility to fix the 
problem.185 
New York also followed Massachusetts’ lead and established a 
basic licensure law.186  It ordered that no person shall practice 
medicine without the consent of an established member of the 
profession “to restrain the presumptuous arrogance of such as, 
through confidence of their own skill or any other sinister respects, 
dare boldly attempt to exercise violence upon or towards the body . 
. . .”187  The law was severely underenforced, but it established a 
framework for direct public involvement in the practice of private 
medicine.188 
Probably the most notable actor in the licensure movement 
was Dr. Caldwaller Colden of New York.  He practiced as a surgeon 
and quickly rose to become a leading public official.189  He was 
 
 179. Id. at 32. 
 180. See HENRY WILLIAM ELSON, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 138 
(1904), available at http://www.usahistory.info/colonies/New-York.html. 
 181. DUFFY, supra note 160, at 25-26. 
 182. Id. at 29. 
 183. Id. at 23-24. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 33. 
 187. Id. (quoting JAMES J. WALSH, HISTORY OF THE MEDICAL SOCIETY OF THE 
STATE OF NEW YORK 11 (1907)). 
 188. Id. at 33-34. 
 189. Id. at 42-43.  “[H]e was without question the first significant medical 
figure in New York.”  Id. at 43. 
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influential in establishing the first statewide licensing law in 1760.190  
It required that all persons wishing to practice medicine must 
appear before an appointed government council and imposed fines 
on any person caught practicing without a license.191  The laws 
increased the value of medical education to both the community 
and to doctors who were financially dependant upon those willing 
to see them.192 
The more visible regulation of medical professionals also 
encouraged the creation of hospitals, or sick houses.  By 1773, New 
York had appropriated money and land to several esteemed 
members of a recently founded medical college and construction 
began.193  The rise of the medical college, the hospital and licensing 
were all interrelated.194  As licensing increased a doctor’s need for 
education, the greater student enrolments required clinics where 
the trade could be practiced.195  Boston developed much faster in 
this area as the city’s Selectmen approved a quarantine hospital in 
1719.196  Public officials made ad-hoc decisions regarding whom to 
quarantine, but relied on the opinion of respected doctors before 
making a final order.197 
Mass epidemics were likely the impetus for most public action 
as exhibited by cities’ significant investment in quarantine laws.  
Smallpox brought disaster to Boston in 1721, 1729, and again in 
1752 killing hundreds and sickening thousands.198  Philadelphia was 
plagued in 1736 and Charleston was hit in 1738.199  The epidemics 
marked two important changes in public health care.  First, 
inoculations were invented and local governments became 
contentiously involved in their regulation.200  Many of the new 
 
 190. Id. at 65. 
 191. Id. at 65-66.  Medical licensing was still very much in its infancy and not 
very effective.  Medical societies that were largely constituted with educated 
doctors wanted to ensure the sanctity of their professions, but had little ability to 
oversee daily operation of apprenticed or self trained surgeons.  For a more 
thorough discussion of early licensing see PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 44-47 (1982). 
 192. DUFFY, supra note 160, at 65. 
 193. Id. at 66-67. 
 194. Id. at 65-66. 
 195. Id. at 66. 
 196. BLAKE, supra note 160, at 35-36. 
 197. Id. at 46. 
 198. Id. at 54-55, 75, 83-87 (noting the various outbreaks). 
 199. Id. at 78, 82.  Philadelphia took little effort in developing any long term 
strategies and was hit with minor epidemics nearly every four years.  Id. at 111-12. 
 200. Id. at 62-63, 96-97. 
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educated doctors inoculated the sick without city approval, 
sparking concern among public officials that the practice may 
endanger rather than benefit public health.201  Eventually city 
governments caved, and although many had made vaccination 
illegal for a period, most eventually permitted or required 
vaccinations.202  The debate marks an important chapter in state 
experimentation.  Communities did not practice inoculation in the 
same manner.  Boston experienced a fifty-year battle over whether 
inoculation was a desired or healthy activity and at points outlawed 
the practice.203  New York on the other hand embraced it mid-
century and continued to inoculate despite controversy.204 
The increase of quarantine houses was also dramatic, but most 
importantly, epidemics encouraged the recording of vital 
statistics.205  Cities began experimenting with inoculation and 
needed to assess effectiveness.  Although birth and death 
certificates had been issued in Boston for nearly 100 years, the 
records were incomplete and not much significance to public 
health.206  Taking toll of the causes of death was probably essential 
for students of medicine who could now look at patterns of disease 
and attempt to discern root causes. 
The inability of doctors to determine the etiology of most 
diseases also pressed governing bodies to pursue preventive 
sanitation and curative quarantine strategies.207  In early and 
revolutionary America, much of medical science was devoted to 
understanding and curing disease, and this was closely related to 
sanitation.208  Practitioners did not understand germ theory and saw 
their job as not only treating the sick, but also providing conditions 
to keep them healthy.209  For example, cities would often halt ships 
at port if infection was present.210  Even more astonishing, often 
every ship departing from plagued cities was ordered inspected, 
often by medical professionals, until the epidemic was considered 
 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 114-15. 
 203. Id. at 52-73 (discussing the beginning of the inoculation debate), 82-98 
(discussing the later years of the inoculation debate). 
 204. Id. at 97. 
 205. Id. at 106-07. 
 206. Id. at 106. 
 207. See Parmet, supra note 157, at 295. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. See BLAKE, supra note 160, at 80-82. 
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over.211  These positions would become even more pronounced in 
post revolutionary states.212 
2. Post-Revolution and Municipal Controls 
By 1800 it was clear that local and state government had a role 
to play in health care.  Johann Peter Frank, an enlightenment 
writer and doctor, believed the core function of government was to 
act as “medical police” to “apply certain principles for the health 
care of people living in society.”213  The city of Chicago was founded 
on these principles in 1833 after a cholera epidemic necessitated 
an organized response.214 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court issued one the most 
resounding and clear indications of health care’s role in city 
governance.  In Baker v. City of Boston,215 a landowner had used a 
creek running by his property to transport goods, which the city 
had set to fill.216  He challenged the right of the city to restrict his 
access to water, but the court found it was within the right and duty 
of the city to do what it must to protect public health.217 
It has not been denied, nor can it be, that the mayor and 
aldermen are clothed with legislative powers and 
prerogatives to a certain extent, and that they are fully 
empowered to adopt measures of police, for the purpose 
of preserving the health, and promoting the comfort, 
convenience and general welfare of the inhabitants within 
the city.  Among these powers no one is more important 
than that for the preservation of the public health.  It is 
not only the right but the imperative duty of the city 
government, to watch over the health of the citizens, and 
to remove every nuisance, so far as they may be able, 
which may endanger it.  And they have necessarily the 
 
 211. Id. at 78. 
 212. Parmet, supra note 157, at 295-96. 
 213. WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN 
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 192 (1996) (quoting JOHANN PETER FRANK, A System 
of Complete Medical Police, in SELECTIONS FROM JOHANN PETER FRANK (Erna Lesky ed., 
1976)). 
 214. Id. at 193.  By the following year, “a stringent health code (including 
provisions for the removal of nuisances, the disposal of waste, street cleaning, 
house inspection, mandatory public works, a cholera hospital, and Committees of 
Vigilance) greeted the onset of a new cholera season.”  Id. 
 215. 12 Pick. 184 (Mass. 1831). 
 216. Id. at 188. 
 217. Id. at 198. 
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power of deciding in what manner this shall be done; and 
their decision is conclusive, unless they transcend the 
powers conferred by the city charter, or violate the 
constitution.218 
The strength of this language is not surprising considering 
every member on the court lived through the small pox and “yellow 
fever” epidemics (mostly typhoid, typhus, and malaria) that swept 
the east coast in the early nineteenth century.219  The diseases were 
disastrous and hit every city on a near yearly basis causing 
evacuations and mass quarantines.220  Even before 1800, New York 
authorized a commission to study the conditions and causes of 
disease.221  The resulting report covered everything from possible 
causes to recommended solutions and set the stage for a flurry of 
activities.222  By 1810, New York had a full time city health inspector, 
a Board of Health, and had taken the recommendation of local 
doctors to require the issuance of death certificates.223  The New 
York Board even commissioned medical studies to pave the 
direction for new policies.224 
Philadelphia had established its Board of Health before the 
turn of the century and although Boston’s Board was founded in 
1799, it did not get full state authorization until 1816.225  In both 
cases, however, the Boards were given broad and welcomed powers.  
Boston’s Board was permitted “to make rules, regulations and 
orders for preventing, removing, or destroying nuisances, sources 
of filth, and causes of sickness . . . .”226  These included regulations 
on everything from specifying burial site depth to recording the 
 
 218. Id. at 197-98. 
 219. See generally BLAKE, supra note 160, at 126-27, 151-76; DUFFY, supra note 
160, at 97-123. 
 220. BLAKE, supra note 160, at 126-27, 151-76; DUFFY, supra note 160, at 97-123.  
The problem is that the illnesses being contracted probably were not significantly 
affected by most public health measures.  Quarantine would have been only 
moderately effective, and possibly detrimental, because most of the illnesses were 
bacterial mosquito borne, not contagious like the plague.  While draining cellars 
and filling bogs helped, it probably did not resolve the problem. 
 221. DUFFY, supra note 160, at 135-37. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 143-49. 
 224. Id. at 156. 
 225. NOVAK, supra note 213, at 201.  It is also important to note that Boston was 
not actually chartered as a city until 1822.  Prior to that, most governing had been 
at the county level, not by city governance.  See BLAKE, supra note 160, at 234. 
 226. NOVAK, supra note 213, at 201 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 44 (1816), 
“An act to empower the town of Boston to choose a Board of Health, and to 
prescribe their power and duty.”). 
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name, age, and sex of the deceased.227 
New York’s board was comprised of predominantly medical 
officials.228  Boston’s early health officials were mostly politicians, 
often seeking appointment to the board as a political stepping-
stone.229  Despite these differences, heads of the boards took their 
roles seriously.  Benjamin Whitman, who served as Chair of the 
Boston Board of Health for twelve years, upon his resignation 
stated: 
It is . . . all important that the Board of Health, who are 
daily conversant with the state and condition of the city . . 
. and with those causes which aggravate disorders, and 
impair the health and comfort of the people, should have 
the power . . . promptly and effectually to make all such 
orders and regulations, as become indispensable . . . .230 
Like other pronouncements of the era, the Board’s power was 
not meant to address issues such as poverty or economic concerns.  
In 1819, Boston’s Board expressed the limits of its authority after a 
physician called its attention to the poverty that often resulted from 
long bouts with disease: 
[I]t is not within [our] official powers or duty, to afford 
relief to that unhappy family—as [our] authority and duty 
only extends to such sick and diseased persons, as are 
affected, or eminently exposed to contagious or 
malignant disorders, such as jeopardize the health and life 
of the citizens . . . and not to cases of poverty and distress 
or sickness of an ordinary nature . . . .231 
These self imposed limitations did not prevent the boards 
from achieving moderate successes.  Cities dramatically improved 
programs for sanitation, quarantine housing, and some basic 
treatment in substandard hospitals.232  However, the lack of 
significant medical advancements during the period meant little 
changed in the methods used to combat health care problems.  
The medical revolution of the mid-nineteenth century would 
inevitably expand the state’s role in medical regulation even 
 
 227. BLAKE, supra note 160, at 212, 214. 
 228. See DUFFY, supra note 160, at 130-44. 
 229. BLAKE, supra note 160, at 230. 
 230. Id. at 236 (quoting Bd. of Health, Comm. of Week, Records (1821-24), 
May 10, 1823 (farewell address by Benjamin Whitman)). 
 231. Id. at 241 (quoting Bd. of Health, Comm. of Week, Records (1821-21), 
Aug. 17, 1819 (the Board members’ response)). 
 232. See id. at 192, 207. 
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further. 
3. The Modern State Administrative System 
The medical advancements of the mid-nineteenth century 
such as anesthesia, sterilization of instruments, and the eventual 
understanding of germ theory transformed the medical profession 
and its regulations.233  Medical college admissions and graduate 
rates soared accordingly.234  This placed an economic hurdle before 
well-trained and well-educated clinicians who were competing with 
many self-taught or simply self-professed doctors.235 
Educated doctors, who were probably motivated in part by 
their wallets and in part by legitimate concern for the practice of 
their profession, succeeded in finally pressuring state health boards 
to enact clear and strong licensing laws by the 1870s.236  These 
licensing schemes, like their predecessors, never explicitly 
delineated control over specific practices.  Rather, licensure laws 
simply required accreditation from reputable medical programs 
and left the practice of medicine to the medical community.237  It 
was clear administrators would not and could not effectively control 
medical developments.  As was the case in the Colonies, doctors 
would go to public officials, present their ideas, and regulations 
would be born. 
The number of people graduating from medical schools had 
another important impact: hospital growth.  What began as a 
proliferation of quarantine hospitals nearly a century earlier was by 
1850 a new public necessity.  For example, between 1800 and 1855, 
Bellevue’s patient role increased nearly 1000 percent.238  By 1860 it 
was treating nearly 6000 patients annually, and thousands more 
were being seen at one of New York’s eight other newly developed 
hospitals and asylums.239  Additionally, grim facilities were opened 
 
 233. See Edward P. Richards, The Police Power and Regulation of Medical Practice: A 
Historical Review and Guide for Medical Licensing Board Regulation of Physicians in 
ERISA—Qualified Managed Care Organizations, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 201, 209-10 
(1999). 
 234. See DUFFY, supra note 160, at 473. 
 235. See id. at 474-75; STARR, supra note 191, at 81-85. 
 236. See STARR, supra note 191, at 81-85; Richards, supra note 233, at 211. 
 237. Richards, supra note 233, at 211. 
 238. DUFFY, supra note 160, at 250 (only 186 patients were seen over the peak 
summer months in 1803). 
 239. Id. at 498-99. 
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to “treat” the mentally ill.240 
Prior to 1825, most communities did not consider insanity a 
health care issue.241  Insanity was instead often viewed as a moral 
disease.  Communities would send ill individuals to prisons, care for 
them privately, or in some cases literally sneak the impaired into 
neighboring towns with the hope of pushing off their burden.242  
While several asylums existed, care for the mentally ill was not 
considered a public function until Massachusetts took the lead in 
1838.243  Many local communities would pay for the housing of the 
dangerously ill, but as the number of terminally mentally ill 
patients increased, cities could no longer afford to deal with them 
effectively.244  This resulted in battles between state and local 
authorities.245 
Local governments did not want to give up power over their 
institutional housing, but needed the financial backing of the 
state.246  Expectedly, local governments were soon largely cut out.  
Since state funding was at issue, the state needed to regulate 
admissions, length of stays, and treatments provided.247  It is not 
necessary to delve into the type of care provided or the extent to 
which health professionals were involved in the legislation.  The 
nature of the service can be gleaned from the debate between state 
and local officials.248  Both governing bodies envisioned care for ill 
citizens as part of their primary responsibility.249  When the state 
eventually assumed the position, it was seen as a partnership 
between the local and state level; federal involvement was not even 
considered. 
Significant state involvement naturally led to the creation of 
permanent oversight agencies.  Lemuel Shattuck’s 1850 Report of the 
Sanitary Commission of Massachusetts was influential in reorganizing 
state public health planning and succeeded in instituting the first 
 
 240. Id. at 499-500. 
 241. See RUTH B. CAPLAN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE COMMUNITY IN NINETEENTH 
CENTURY AMERICA: THE RECURRING CONCERN WITH THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE 
PREVENTION AND TREATMENT OF MENTAL ILLNESS 65-66 (1969). 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 66. 
 244. Id. at 66-67. 
 245. Id. at 67. 
 246. Id. at 67-70. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 63. 
 249. Id. at 66. 
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state Board of Health in 1869.250  As one author describes: 
State boards were usually charged with the following 
responsibilities: (1) the organization of local boards; (2) 
the collection of medical and vital statistics; (3) the 
investigation of the causes of disease and mortality; (4) 
the removal of causes of disease (especially nuisances) 
with the cooperation of local sanitary officers; (5) the 
supervision of state hygiene institutions like prisons and 
asylums; and (6) the supervision of quarantine.251 
The idea of statewide agencies and uniform public health 
governance attracted many around the country.  In 1872, the 
American Public Health Association was founded and quickly 
issued recommendations on state health care practices.252  The 
Association urged state boards to conduct oversight, assistance, and 
collection of statistics, but sanitation and individual care should 
remain at the local level.253  Shortly after, public health laboratories 
were founded to research the causes of, and cures for, diseases.254  
Both state and local laboratories were to detect diseases and design 
controls, develop new diagnostic procedures, and manufacture and 
distribute vaccines.255  By 1913 every state had some form of health 
department.256 
The short history detailed above does not provide an 
exhaustive examination of the multitude of activities in which states 
have traditionally engaged, but it does indicate the ways in which 
health care was a chief regulatory area of state and local 
governments.  Although the size and reach of public health bodies 
drastically expanded over the last 100 years, the basic functions 
performed by local communities and state offices have not 
significantly changed. 
D. Federal Regulation: A Modern Tradition 
The real emergence of national action in the health care arena 
arose with Roosevelt’s New Deal.257  Prior to 1900, the federal 
 
 250. WILSON G. SMILLIE, PUBLIC HEALTH ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
13 (1935). 
 251. NOVAK, supra note 213, at 203. 
 252. See SMILLIE, supra note 250, at 213, 216-17. 
 253. Id. at 17-18. 
 254. Id. at 18. 
 255. Id. at 175-80. 
 256. Id. at 16, fig. II. 
 257. See James G. Hodge, Jr., The Role of New Federalism and Public Health Law, 12 
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government only marginally involved itself in health care 
activities.258  Within the first quarter of the century, however, 
Congress made a few significant regulations that paved the way for 
the explosion in federal health care involvement.  In 1906, 
Congress passed the Food and Drug Act, which sought to prevent 
adulteration, mislabeling, and fraud in the food and drug 
industry.259  Its requirements aimed at “protecting the pocketbook 
of the consumer as much as the health.”260  Today, the revised Act 
regulates nearly all the “testing, marketing, and promotion” of 
medicines in the United States.261  However, both the original and 
revised Act of 1938 applied, on its face, to only those items 
introduced to or received in interstate commerce.262  The Maternity 
and Infancy Act of 1921, another important pre-New Deal step, was 
the first major federal spending program devoted to public 
health.263  Funding was given to states that agreed to develop 
obstetrics and child care programs.264 
These laws signify the two main sources of federal health care 
authority—the spending power under Article 1, Section 8265 and the 
commerce power under Article 1, Section 8.266  The manner of 
regulation associated with each is significantly different.  The 
spending power does not enable Congress to require or to forcefully 
prevent direct action by a state.267  Rather, if Congress would like a 
state to adopt a particular program, it must offer the state a 
choice.268  The state can receive federal dollars only if it adopts the 
measures suggested by Congress.269  However, the state has the 
 
J.L. & HEALTH 309, 331 (1998). 
 258. Id. at 331-33; JENNIE JACOBS KRONEFELD, THE CHANGING FEDERAL ROLE IN 
U.S. HEALTH CARE POLICY 67-69 (1997). 
 259. KRONEFELD, supra note 258, at 70. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. See 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2002) (providing a clear jurisdictional hook). 
 263. Id.; Hodge, supra note 257, at 332. 
 264. Hodge, supra note 257, at 332. 
 265. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 266. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
 267. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 438 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (implying that 
the federal government cannot compel state action pursuant to the spending 
power). 
 268. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) 
(stating that a state must be given the free choice to voluntarily accept or reject 
federal funds). 
 269. Id. 
32
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss3/7
7KREITMARCUS.DOC 3/13/2005  4:08:28 PM 
2005] RAICH, HEALTH CARE, COMMERCE CLAUSE 989 
authority to reject the funding and not implement the program.270  
The passage of the Sixteenth Amendment, which established the 
federal income tax, provided the government with an enormous 
new purse271 with which the government could finance, among 
other things, health care initiatives.  The Social Security Act of 1935 
was the first major national push to make use of these new funds.  
It established direct aid for maternal and child services and 
invested in local boards of health, health laboratories, and research 
into disease and sanitation control.272  The Supreme Court has not 
addressed the constitutionality of the spending portion of the 
Act.273  Presumably, this is because the power to spend for the 
general welfare was presumed by most to be a valid exercise of 
federal authority. 
Under the spending power, Congress possesses nearly 
unlimited discretion as to how and on what programs tax dollars 
will be spent.274  It is constrained only by the rule that while 
Congress may encourage states to act, it cannot compel a state to 
carry out those acts.275  This has allowed for a large federal effort to 
help improve health care in the United States, pursuant to the 
government’s ability to spend for the general welfare.  For instance, 
the National Institute of Health, which was founded in 1930 for the 
basic purpose of researching hygiene and disease, has blossomed to 
include a National Cancer Institute, National Eye Institute, 
National Institute on Child Health and Human Development, and 
even a National Center for Complimentary and Alternative 
Medicine, to name just a few.276  These centers and institutes are 
primarily research, development, and financial assistance bodies, 
developing programs and strategies which are then offered to states 
for implementation.277  Other Acts, like the Mental Health Act of 
 
 270. See, e.g., Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1202-03 (making 
distinctions between impermissible coercion and a situation where states are “free 
to reject” the funding). 
 271. Hodge, supra note 257, at 333. 
 272. KRONEFELD, supra note 258, at 70-71. 
 273. See generally Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1938) (upholding 
the statutes’ taxing authority). 
 274. See South Dakota v. Dole, 438 U.S. 203, 206-07 (1987) (establishing the 
few limitations on the spending power). 
 275. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992). 
 276. See National Institute of Health, Institutes Centers, and Offices, at 
http://www.nih.gov/icd/ (listing twenty institutes currently within the National 
Institute of Health). 
 277. Id. (providing brief descriptions of each institute). 
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1946, the Mental Retardation Facilities & Community Mental 
Health Service Act of 1963 which financed the growth and 
development of local mental health facilities, and the passage of 
Medicare and Medicaid in 1966 further expanded federal reach.278 
In contrast to the spending power, the commerce power 
enables Congress to prevent certain state (or even private) activities 
that differ from the manner in which it desires to regulate 
commerce.279  For example, the Controlled Substance Act (CSA),280 
enacted in 1970, sets a baseline for all marketing, distribution, and 
sale of drugs in the United States.  The CSA goes beyond many 
other federal health care measures by attempting to regulate very 
local activities within the medical profession.  The CSA includes 
provisions governing the quantity of drugs that may be prescribed 
or distributed.281  The Attorney General is authorized to revoke the 
registration of any person who does not comply with these 
provisions282 and the CSA even allows suspension if the Attorney 
General deems an action to be “an imminent danger to the public 
health or safety.”283 
Although the CSA is not an express statement of control over 
health care decisions, the modern practice of medicine necessitates 
the use of some type of drug.  The apparent discretion given to the 
Attorney General to decide whether an action is an imminent 
threat to public health gives the office enormous control over 
medical decisions.284  The CSA, by its own terms, also directly 
governs the mere possession of a controlled substance.285  It 
curiously fails to require that the substance be manufactured, 
distributed, or even that the possessor have the intent to distribute 
or manufacture the substance.  Governing the mere possession of 
drugs pushed federal regulation into uncharted territory. 
Federal reach under the Commerce Clause has also affected 
 
 278. See FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 135, at 68. 
 279. See, e.g., New York, 505 U.S. at 167 (discussing recognition of regulatory 
power over private activities specifically and regulatory powers more generally). 
 280. Controlled Substance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2004)). 
 281. 21 U.S.C. § 823(g)(1)(c) (2004). 
 282. Id. § 824(a)(4). 
 283. Id. § 824(d). 
 284. Id. § 824(d).  The Attorney General will be able to make medical 
decisions regarding when a drug is an imminent danger, which could restrict 
doctors in their ability to prescribe medications they believe will assist their 
patients. 
 285. Id. § 844(a). 
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medical decision-making in less direct ways.  In 1974, Congress 
passed the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act 
(ERISA).286  A main provision of the Act preempts state laws that 
relate to employee benefit plans.287  These plans include employer 
provided health care plans.288  States that desire to ensure insurance 
companies provide the type and quality of care believed most 
beneficial to its citizens have often found ERISA imposed 
preemption bars.289  This includes such things as state tort and 
contract actions when state law requires coverage for certain 
medical practices, but the employer’s selected plan does not.290 
A detailed history and overview of federal public health 
regulation is beyond the scope of this article, but the examples 
given above provide an adequate look into the nature of federal 
health care regulation.  Today, federal health care programs are 
mostly governed by six agencies: “1) The Centers for Disease 
Control; (2) the National Institutes of Health; (3) the Food and 
Drug Administration; (4) The Health Resources and Services 
Administration; (5) the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health 
Administration; and (6) the Agency for Toxic Substances and 
Disease Registry.”291  These combined agencies are involved in 
many aspects of health care.  They assess and gather health related 
statistics, research and develop cures for diseases, implement 
funding for health care and medical provisions, develop and 
implement health care policies, seek to educate the public and 
health care professionals, and a host of other activities from policy 




 286. See Employee Retirement Income Securities Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. V 
1993)). 
 287. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2004) (including benefit plans as defined in 29 
U.S.C. § 1003 (2004)). 
 288. 29 U.S.C. § 1103. 
 289. See James E. Holloway, ERISA, Preemption and Comprehensive Federal Health 
Care: A Call for “Cooperative Federalism” to Preserve the States’ Role in Formulating Health 
Care Policy, 16 CAMPBELL L. REV. 405, 439-42 (1994). 
 290. Id. at 420-21. 
 291. FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 135, at 166. 
 292. Id. at 168-70. 
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IV. RAICH AND THE REACH OF NEW FEDERALISM 
 
A. The Role of Traditional State Interests 
 
Because Lopez and Morrison do not address where the 
traditional state interest issue falls into the Commerce Clause 
analysis, it is possible that the Court will follow the Ninth Circuit 
and resolve Raich293 without discussing the extent to which health 
care is traditionally a state concern.  If the Court does exclude the 
issue from its analysis in Raich entirely, it could affect future health 
care-related Commerce Clause cases by signaling that the 
traditional state interest consideration will not factor into Morrison 
analysis.  A result along those lines, however, would speak more to 
the future of Commerce Clause jurisprudence generally than to 
health care.  Likewise, the Court may dispose of Raich, without 
reaching the Commerce Clause issue at all, by holding that the 
plaintiffs do not have standing.294  Because the first scenario would 
impact health care at most tangentially, and the second not at all, 
the implications of both are beyond the scope of this article.  The 
more likely scenario is that the Court will follow Lopez and Morrison 
and include the traditional state concern issue in its Commerce 
Clause analysis.  The potential for Raich to have a broader impact 
on health care rests in this possibility—in how the Supreme Court 
will define, interpret, and weigh the traditional state interest at 
issue.295 
Part III reveals that, while health care has traditionally been 
the province of the states, the federal government has become 
increasingly involved in regulating health.  In addition, it is clear 
that a great deal of federal health care regulation is constitutional 
and, without discussing the merits of particular policies, we 
 
 293. 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 294. Although neither party has addressed standing in its briefs to the 
Supreme Court, Judge Beam’s Ninth Circuit dissent argued that the plaintiffs did 
not have standing.  Id. at 1235-37 (Beam J., dissenting). 
 295. See supra Part II.B.  Although the parties briefed the question of medical 
necessity to the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit did not address this question 
and the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari on the issue.  See Raich, 352 F.3d 
1222 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S.Ct. 2909 (June 28, 2004) (No. 03-1454).  
So, though a holding on medical necessity grounds would also have an effect on 
health care generally, these facts make it unlikely that the Court will address 
medical necessity for individual use in Raich. 
36
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss3/7
7KREITMARCUS.DOC 3/13/2005  4:08:28 PM 
2005] RAICH, HEALTH CARE, COMMERCE CLAUSE 993 
generally believe that significant federal involvement in health care 
is desirable.  In the area of Medicaid, for example, ceding federal 
power to states may weaken patient protections and decrease the 
access to health care for poor, disabled, or elderly citizens.296  
Federal power over some areas of public health may even preclude 
state regulation,297 either through preemption298 or the dormant 
Commerce Clause, which prevents states from engaging in divisive 
or protectionist regulatory policies.299  Few of the major federal 
health regulations, such as Medicaid, conflict with the notion that 
health care is traditionally a state concern.  But, the federal 
government’s increased involvement in health policy contributes to 
the difficulty for the Supreme Court in Raich of addressing and 
defining which areas of health care constitute a traditional state 
concern and which do not. 
The plaintiffs and the Government in Raich both argue that 
the traditional state concern factor weighs in their favor.  The 
Government argues that the plaintiffs wish to “function essentially 
as unregulated and unsupervised drug manufacturers and 
pharmacies”300 and that the determination of what medical 
products can be made available for medical use is not an area of 
regulation traditionally reserved to the states.301  The plaintiffs’ 
argue that the federal government has primary authority over 
protecting consumers from misbranded drugs but that the 
relationship between patients and doctors is an area traditionally 
 
 296. See generally Dayna Bowen Matthew, The “New Federalism” Approach to 
Medicaid: Empirical Evidence that Ceding Inherently Federal Authority to the States Harms 
Public Health, 90 KY. L.J. 973 (2001) (arguing that empirical evidence indicates 
increasing state control over Medicaid leads to undesirable results). 
 297. See, e.g., Wendy E. Parmet, Regulation and Federalism: Legal Impediments to 
State Health Care Reform, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 121 (1993) (discussing the various ways 
in which federal authority may preclude states from experimenting with health 
care reforms). 
 298. See supra Part III (discussing how ERISA preempts state regulation in 
employee benefits). 
 299. Maine’s effort to lower prescription drug prices for people without a 
prescription drug insurance plan is an example of a state healthcare policy that 
faced a dormant Commerce Clause challenge.  The Supreme Court, however, 
ruled in favor of Maine.  Pharm. Research & Mfrs. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003); 
see also Whitney Magee Phelps, Comment, Maine’s Prescription Drug Plan: A Look Into 
the Controversy, 65 ALB. L. REV. 243 (2001) (discussing the dormant Commerce 
Clause issues related to Maine’s prescription drug law). 
 300. Petitioners’ Brief at 33-34, Raich (No. 03-1454). 
 301. Brief of Amici Curiae Dupont at 15-17, Raich (No. 03-1454) [hereinafter 
Dupont Brief]. 
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reserved to the states.302  This question is, in some ways, tied to the 
Commerce Clause question of what level of generality should be 
used to define the regulated class of activities.303  However, the 
Supreme Court’s analysis of the traditional state concern issue 
would impact health care’s relationship with the Commerce Clause 
independent of the purely Commerce Clause questions. 
If the Court accepts the Government’s argument that the 
activity at issue is not a traditional state concern, it is difficult to 
imagine a health care related activity that would be.  This is because 
the Government argues that the federal power to regulate 
interstate medical products also extends over the state’s traditional 
role in regulating the doctor patient relationship despite the purely 
intrastate character of the activity.304  “In short, neither the 
purported medical use of marijuana nor the role of a physician in 
approving it provides the slightest basis for excluding it from the 
comprehensive coverage of the CSA . . . .”305  If the Court finds this 
reasoning persuasive in the context of its traditional state interest 
analysis, it would hold that the unchallenged federal power over 
commercial interstate distribution of medicines306 includes the 
corollary intrastate regulation of related activities.  This theory 
would not necessarily preclude all Commerce Clause challenges 
related to health care.  A government regulation might still fail the 
Morrison test even if the activity regulated is not a traditional state 
interest.  But such a reading would make it difficult to conceive of a 
health care activity that could be classified as a traditional state 
concern. 
Similarly, the Court could find that the activity in Raich is 
traditionally left to the states and still hold for the Government 
based on the four Morrison factors.  This outcome, though, is 
probable only if the Court accepts the Government’s assertion that 
the activity at issue is the regulation of medical products.  But, 
 
 302. See generally Nurses Brief at 17, Raich (No. 03-15481). 
 303. Compare Brief of Amici Curiae Constitutional Law Scholars, Raich (No. 03-
1454) with Petitioners’ Brief, Raich (No. 03-1454).  For example, the government’s 
traditional state concern argument dovetails with its assertion that the activity 
engaged in by the plaintiffs should be defined broadly as “affect[ing] the 
marijuana market as a whole” for purposes of Commerce Clause analysis.  
Petitioners’ Brief at 20. 
 304. Petitioners’ Brief at 40-41. 
 305. Id. at 41. 
 306. See Nurses Brief at 5-6 (agreeing that Congress has used its commerce 
power to protect consumers from interstate sales of medicines but arguing that 
this power has not historically included intrastate activity). 
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whatever the ultimate outcome of Raich, the plaintiff’s position on 
the state interest issue seems to align closely and persuasively with 
the history of health care regulation in the United States.  The 
plaintiffs distinguish local health care activity, like the physician’s 
practice of medicine, as an area traditionally regulated and left to 
the states from the sort of health care the federal government has 
historically regulated.307  This accurately reflects the vast majority of 
federal health care laws, which have not generally intruded into 
state functions but rather attacked problems that states had not—
and possibly could not have—dealt with themselves.  For example, 
the 1906 Food and Drug Act, “Congress’ first significant enactment 
in the field of public health,”308 did not regulate an area already 
addressed by the states.  Indeed, one of the Government’s amici 
acknowledges that “[i]n 1900, medical products were essentially 
unregulated,”309 even as it argues that the 1906 Act demonstrates 
the federal government has traditionally regulated the activity at 
issue in Raich.310  But the 1906 Act had nothing to do with 
regulating the relationship between physicians and patients that 
had traditionally been left to the states; rather, it was enacted to 
combat the widespread problem of interstate trade in adulterated 
and misbranded drugs.311 
Like a great deal of federal health care legislation, the 1906 
Act did not encroach into areas regulated by the states.  It 
regulated health care in a way states had not. 
The expansion of national powers into the field of public 
health prompted a change in public health objectives . . . .  
Merely controlling the effects of public health problems 
was inadequate.  National powers allowed for the broad 
regulation of the very conditions which led to such 
problems.  Thus, public health strategy has changed from 
the localized treatment and prevention of public health 
dilemmas to the advance control of the conditions in 
which such effects arose.312 
Supreme Court cases from the early 1900s confirm the 
distinction between the scope of federal regulation and the areas of 
health care traditionally left to the states.  In Linder v. United 
 
 307. See Appellants’ Opening Brief, Raich (No. 03-15481). 
 308. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996). 
 309. Brief of Amici Curiae Dupont at 15, Raich (No. 03-1454). 
 310. Id. at 16. 
 311. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 475. 
 312. Hodge, supra note 257, at 337-38. 
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States,313 the Court addressed the application of the Harrison Act—a 
1914 law regulating products containing opium and cocaine 
through Congress’ taxing power—to a tax-paying physician who 
had given one tablet of morphine and three tablets of cocaine to 
an addicted patient, without filing out the appropriate tax form.314  
The statute imposed a tax on a physician’s distribution of opiates 
and coca-derived substances in the course of his professional 
services,315 but the Government argued that distribution to an 
addict, without supervision and control of a physician, was outside 
the professional practice of medicine.316  The Court disagreed with 
this argument, stating that “direct control of medical practice in 
the States is beyond the power of the Federal Government.”317 
Linder, which was decided well after the government began to 
regulate interstate traffic in medicine, supports the distinction 
advanced by the plaintiffs.318  If the Court holds that the activity in 
Raich has traditionally been a state concern, it will clarify some of 
the possible tensions between the notion of health care as a state 
concern and the increase in federal public health regulation 
consistent with the traditional understanding articulated in Linder.  
The holding could have a strong impact on other areas of health 
care by influencing healthcare-related Commerce Clause cases.  
But the ruling would not jeopardize the vast majority of federal 
health care law that is either unrelated to Congress’ commerce 
power or unquestionably regulates commercial activity.  Such a 
holding would not automatically place local health care activity 
outside the scope of federal regulatory power, as overlapping 
regulatory authority between state and federal law is possible.319  
The potential impact of adopting this distinction in Raich on future 
Commerce Clause cases is best demonstrated by analyzing how it 
 
 313. 268 U.S. 5 (1925).  This case is also discussed by amici to the plaintiffs in 
Raich.  Nurses Brief at 17, Raich (No. 03-15481). 
 314. Linder, 268 U.S. at 11. 
 315. Id. at 12. 
 316. Id. at 16.  “[The tablets] were not administered by him or by any nurse or 
other person acting under his direction, nor were they consumed or intended for 
consumption in his presence.” Id. 
 317. Id. at 18. 
 318. Id. at 17.  “Congress cannot, under the pretext of executing delegated 
power, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the Federal 
Government.“  Id. 
 319. As noted above, the Court in Raich could find that the plaintiff’s activity 
has traditionally been regulated by the states, but hold against them because of 
other Commerce Clause factors. 
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might affect examples of particular federal health care regulations 
grounded in the commerce power. 
 
B. Health Care Law After Raich 
 
1. Medical Marijuana 
 
California’s Compassionate Use Act (CUA) is a model of 
current state/federal health care conflicts.  The CUA was designed 
not as a market regulatory tool, but solely as a public health 
measure.320  Its purpose was “[t]o ensure that seriously ill 
Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for medical 
purposes where that medical use is deemed appropriate and has 
been recommended by a physician who has determined that the 
person’s health would benefit from the use of marijuana . . . .”321  
The Act serves two traditional state interests.  First, it directly 
governs health care practice as it exempts doctors from certain 
state criminal laws relating to the illegal sale or cultivation of 
marijuana.322  It has also traditionally been within a state’s 
prerogative to experiment with new methods of treating disease 
and illness, similar to previous state practices with inoculation.323 
Other state medical marijuana laws also show an express 
medical decision at work.  For example, Maine’s medical marijuana 
provision provides that “a person . . . may lawfully possess a usable 
amount of marijuana for medical use if, at the time of that 
possession, the person has available an authenticated copy of a 
medical record or other written documentation from a physician” 
demonstrating one of several enumerated medical conditions.324  
Maine medical marijuana patients would be engaging in the 
possession of a “useable amount”325 of marijuana, for personal 
medical use pursuant to “written documentation from a physician” 
in conformity with state law, similar to the facts implicated in 
 
 320. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1996) (illustrating the 
purpose of the legislation). 
 321. Id. § 11362.5(b)(1)(A). 
 322. Id. § 11362.5(d). 
 323. See supra notes 201-204. 
 324. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 2382-B(5) (1975). 
 325. Id. § 2382-B(3)(E) (“‘Usable amount of marijuana for medical use’ means 
2 1/2 ounces or less of harvested marijuana and a total of 6 plants, of which no 
more than 3 may be mature, flowering plants.”). 
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Raich.326 
A finding that these types of programs are traditionally matters 
of state concern would undercut the government’s assertion that 
the broader regulatory scheme envisioned by the CSA covers the 
“use of controlled substances for medical purposes and the role of 
physicians in approving their use.”327  The Court’s history of 
rejecting such claims bodes well for state health care advocates.  As 
noted above, in Linder, for example, the Court refused to accept 
that distribution of drugs to an addict fell outside the practice of 
medicine.328 
A finding that many medical marijuana laws belong to a class 
of traditional state functions does not necessarily remove all federal 
regulatory power, and not just in Commerce Clause cases.  The 
spending clause could be used to encourage the states to oppose 
medical marijuana programs.  Additionally, entering into treaties, 
such as the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 329 may 
require federal intervention into areas traditionally governed by 
the states.330  However, a finding that the Single Convention 
mandates that the CSA apply to state medical marijuana is 
independent of whether a matter traditionally left to the states is 
beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause. 
2. Physician-Assisted Suicide 
Like medical marijuana, activity performed in conformity with 
statutes that permit physician-assisted suicide may be beyond the 
reach of federal commerce power if the activity is found to be a 
traditional state interest.  Oregon’s Death With Dignity Act331 was 
upheld by the Ninth Circuit after two citizen initiatives and a 
lengthy battle in federal court.332  The law permits licensed Oregon 
 
 326. See Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1225-26 (9th Cir. 2003).  By contrast, 
however, the California statute at issue in Raich exempted from prosecution 
patients who possessed marijuana “for the personal medical purposes of the 
patient upon the written or oral recommendation or approval of a physician.”  Id. at 
1225 (emphasis added) (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(d) (West 
1996)). 
 327. Petitioners’ Brief at 40, Raich (No. 03-1454). 
 328. 268 U.S. 5 (1925). 
 329. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, March 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407 
(1967), 520 U.N.T.S. 151 (1964). 
 330. See Dupont Brief, supra note 301, at 10. 
 331. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (2003). 
 332. See Scott Gast, Who Defines “Legitimate Medical Practice?” Lessons Learned from 
the Controlled Substances Act, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Oregon v. Ashcroft, 10 VA. 
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doctors to prescribe drugs to patients for use in ending their own 
lives.333  Of course, however, the Controlled Substance Act regulates 
the actual medications being prescribed.  The CSA classifies drugs 
based upon a determination by the Attorney General regarding 
multiple factors relating to a substance’s medicinal and addictive 
properties.334  It also allows the Attorney General to deny or revoke 
a registration if he concludes the registration would be 
“inconsistent with the public interest.”335 
In 2001, John Ashcroft issued an interpretive ruling that the 
dispensing of controlled substances for the purposes of suicide was 
inconsistent with the public interest and threatened to revoke the 
registration of any practitioner that prescribed medications for 
such purposes.336  The ruling was immediately contested.  The 
District Court, and the Ninth Circuit on appeal, found that as 
worded, the CSA did not authorize the Attorney General to decide 
whether physician-assisted suicide is a permissible medical 
practice.337  Because the federal policy at issue was based on an 
interpretive ruling, the underlying legal standard is much different 
than Raich, and neither court considered whether Congress had 
the authority under the commerce clause to prevent physician-
assisted suicide over a validly enacted state law.338  Despite these 
differences, the question of health care as a traditional state 
concern is quite similar in each case. 
The Supreme Court has also implied that physician-assisted 
suicide implicates the traditional state health concern.  Justice 
O’Connor noted in Washington v. Glucksberg, “States are presently 
undertaking extensive and serious evaluation of physician-assisted 
suicide and other related issues,” and will act as “laboratories” for 
constructing safe and humane policies.339  O’Connor’s statement 
rings of a strong constitutional preference for deferring to state 
legislatures.  While the Death with Dignity Act is an assertion of a 
traditional state power, it may not be controlled directly by the 
 
J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 261, 261-63 (2002). 
 333. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.800 (2003). 
 334. 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2004). 
 335. Id. § 823(f). 
 336. Gast, supra note 332, at 262. 
 337. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1088-89 (D. Or. 2002), rev’d, 
368 F.3d 1118, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 338. See Ashcroft, 368 F.3d at 1125. 
 339. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 737 (1997) (O’Connor J., 
concurring). 
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outcome in Raich, in that it does not equally involve the 
distribution of marketing of medicines—an accepted federal 
function. 
For instance, the Act does not set out a single particular 
purpose or define its function other than through piecing together 
multiple sections.340  Nor does it alter the federal requirements for 
obtaining prescription drugs.  It specifies only the procedures that 
must be followed, in addition to those required by the CSA, by any 
medical practitioner prescribing lawfully available medications for 
the purpose of ending a life.341 
Although the Act does not define its purpose, Oregon has 
asserted that the law “‘establish[es] and enforce[s] standards of 
conduct within its borders relative to everyone there.’”342  While the 
explicit interference with the Act by Congress would present 
unique Commerce Clause concerns, in the current legal dispute 
the traditional state interest analysis and arguments are largely 
similar to those in Raich.343  As in the medical marijuana context, 
the federal government’s argument in Oregon v. Ashcroft would 
largely permit the federal government to declare what is an 
appropriate medical purpose even if a state disagrees with the 
determination.344  A finding that regulation of the activity in Raich is 
traditionally left to the states would give greater force to Oregon’s 
argument that the proper federal role is regulating the traffic and 
safety of particular substances, not interpreting whether those 
substances should be lawfully prescribed to particular patients. 
3. Stem Cell Research and Human Cloning 
“Human life is a creation of God - not a commodity to be 
exploited by man,” said President George W. Bush, discussing stem 
cells in Dallas before the Texas Knights of Columbus convention.345  
Rarely has the stem cell debate been publicly phrased in terms of 
 
 340. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800-.897 (2003). 
 341. Id. 
 342. Appellee’s Brief of the State of Oregon at 20, Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. 
Supp. 2d 1077 (D. Or. 2000) (No. 3:0101647) (quoting Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 
347 U.S. 442, 449 (1954)). 
 343. See Brief for Appellants at II.C., Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077 
(D. Or. 2000) (No. 02-35587). 
 344. Id. 
 345. Ken Fireman, Election 2004: On the Conservative Side Vying for Catholic Vote, 
Bush Reiterates Views and Promises More Funding for Religious Charities, NEWSDAY, Aug. 
4, 2004, at A18. 
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commerce, rather than medicine or public health.  But the federal 
commerce power, however, could play a significant role in the 
future legislation related to stem cells and human cloning. 
In 2001, the House of Representatives passed the Human 
Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001 (HCPA).346  The Act specified that: 
It shall be unlawful for any person or entity, public or 
private, in or affecting interstate commerce, knowingly—
(1) to perform or attempt to perform human cloning; (2) 
to participate in an attempt to perform human cloning; or 
(3) to ship or receive for any purpose an embryo 
produced by human cloning or any product derived from 
such embryo.347 
The prohibition does not immediately come across as a 
significant limitation on state health care practices.  However, the 
term “human cloning” was defined as “human asexual 
reproduction, accomplished by introducing nuclear material from 
one or more human somatic cells into a fertilized or unfertilized 
oocyte whose nuclear material has been removed or inactivated so 
as to produce a living organism (at any stage of development) . . . 
.”348  This is an incredibly broad definition.349  The inclusion of the 
qualifier “(at any stage of development)” would necessarily include 
the point immediately after a human cell is duplicated.  Such a 
broad definition implicates another line of medicinal policy that is 
not instantly apparent from the title of the Act—stem cell research. 
Cloning and stem cell research actually share a common 
scientific base.  Both practices often implement a practice called 
somatic cell nuclear transplantation or transfer (SCNT).350  The 
cloning procedure for much stem cell research and direct human 
cloning “is identical up to the point where a blastocyte created 
through SCNT is either implanted into a woman’s uterus 
(reproductive cloning) or used as a source of stem cells (research 
cloning).”351  If passed, the HCPA would prevent both reproductive 
 
 346. H.R. 2505, 107th Cong. (2001); see Jonathan S. Schwartz, The Human 
Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001: Vagueness and Federalism, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 79, 81-82 
(2002). 
 347. H.R. 2505, 107th Cong. § 2(a) (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 302) (2001). 
 348. H.R. 2505, 107th Cong. § 2(a) (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 301(1)). 
 349. See Schwartz, supra note 346, at 82-83. 
 350. Charity Schiller, Comment, Stem Cell Research and Conditional Federal 
Funding: Do State Laws Allowing More Extensive Research Pose a Problem for Federalism?, 
31 PEPP. L. REV. 1017, 1027 (2004). 
 351. Alexander Morgan Carpron, Placing a Moratorium on Research Cloning to 
Ensure Effective Control over Reproductive Cloning, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1057, 1061 (2002). 
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and research cloning. 
In November of 2004, California voters approved Proposition 
71, the California Stem Cell Research and Cures Act (Stem Cell 
Act).352  The Act in part, amends the California Constitution to 
create an Institute for Regenerative Medicine that has the authority 
to fund SCNT stem cell production for research purposes.353  The 
motivation behind the Act cannot be any clearer.  It is designed to: 
“Maximize the use of research funds by giving priority to stem cell 
research that has the greatest potential for therapies and cures, 
specifically focused on . . . vital research opportunities that cannot, 
or are unlikely to receive timely or sufficient federal funding . . . 
.”354  New Jersey also permits the use of SCNT research, but 
expressly prohibits the sale, transfer, or exchange of stem cell 
products for any “valuable consideration.”355  New Jersey has 
removed the commercial nature of the research and resigned the 
issue to purely medical bases.356 
However, members of Congress continue to introduce the 
HCPA with the intent to prevent the type of research expressly 
provided for by New Jersey and California Law.357  The supporters 
of HCPA find authority under the “Public Health Services Act, 
[PHSA] which gives the FDA the power to regulate ‘biological 
products’ that are used to treat medical conditions.”358  The FDA 
has also stated that human cloning falls within the definition of the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act because the cloned cells can be 
defined as a drug.359  Further, “drugs” are defined as “articles (other 
than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the 
body.”360 
We are not going to assess whether this interpretation of the 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act is correct, but the opposing positions 
put forth by New Jersey and California will assuredly spark legal 
challenge if the federal ban becomes law.  More important for our 
 
 352. Stem Cell Research and Cures Act, at http://www.curesforcalifornia. 
com/initiative.php [hereinafter Stem Cell Act] (last visited Feb. 13, 2005). 
 353. Id. § 4 sec. 3. 
 354. Id. § 3 ¶ 2. 
 355. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2Z-1 to -2(c)(1) (West 2004). 
 356. See id. 
 357. See Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2003, H.R. 534, 108th Cong. 
(2003); S. 245, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 358. H.R. REP. NO. 108-18, at 3 (2004), (Report from the House Committee on 
the Judiciary on the Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2003). 
 359. Id. 
 360. Id. 
46
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss3/7
7KREITMARCUS.DOC 3/13/2005  4:08:28 PM 
2005] RAICH, HEALTH CARE, COMMERCE CLAUSE 1003 
analysis is whether the act of using SCNT technology to clone a cell 
is a health care function.  California and New Jersey’s laws could 
not be more attuned to an area of traditional state concern.  In 
both cases the law’s purpose is to research and develop treatments 
and cures for disease, the most traditional area of state health care 
regulation.361  The HCPA would intrude into a pure research arena, 
an area we have shown to be within a state’s traditional function. 
The actual language of the PHSA requires that drugs must be 
“used to treat medical conditions.”362  The Supreme Court noted in 
Jones v. United States363 that because the words “used . . . in an activity 
affecting interstate . . . commerce” appeared in a federal arson 
statute, the word “used” must mean something directly commercial 
in nature.364  Otherwise, the distinction between federal and state 
concerns would be lost.365 
Although Jones involved an issue of statutory interpretation, the 
Court might have followed this route to avoid having to find the 
statute unconstitutional for intruding too broadly into traditional 
state activities.366  Likewise, in the context of human cloning, the act 
of cloning itself is akin to a surgical procedure, a medical practice 
that appears to be a purely traditional state activity.  To permit a 
broad reach into all aspects of cloning, regardless of the program’s 
design, purpose, or methods of implementation, would be to 
curtail a state’s ability to research solutions to state wide medical 
problems or dictate the tenets of its own medical practice.  This 
reading accepts the need for the national uniform distribution and 
control of medicines, but it reserves states the traditional right to 
engage in medical experimentation.  Extending the theory 
underlying the Jones decision to human cloning provides courts 
with a clear dividing line between traditionally local and 
traditionally federal concerns. 
However, even if such a result occurred, a determined 
Congress or Executive might still be able to prevent states from 
 
 361. See supra Part III. 
 362. H.R. REP. NO. 108-18, at 2 (2004). 
 363. 529 U.S. 848, 856-58 (2000); see also Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 171-75 (2001) (limiting the definition of § 404(a) of 
the Clean Water Act because an expansive definition would intrude too broadly 
into intrastate activities). 
 364. Id. at 857-58. 
 365. Id. at 854 (finding that “used” meant the arson statute only applied to 
commercial buildings). 
 366. See Craig M. Bradley, Federalism and the Federal Criminal Law, 55 HASTINGS 
L.J. 573, 585 (2004). 
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engaging in stem cell research.  In 2004, President Bush began a 
push in the United Nations to enter into a treaty banning stem cell 
research and human cloning.367  Although most nations seem to 
oppose such a position, (even close allies of the United States) a 
treaty could effectively prevent state experimentation, regardless of 
how traditional the activity may be.368 
If the election of 2004 is prescient in any way, then the stem 
cell and cloning debate will only increase in the coming years.  
Religious conservatives will almost surely continue to push for 
passage of the HCPA or similar laws.  Other states may also join 
California and New Jersey in directly funding, or at a minimum, 
permitting research cloning. 
4. Abortion 
The abortion debate’s relationship to Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence is twofold.  First, whether the practice is a matter of 
traditional state concern, and second, if it is, whether the right to 
an abortion pursuant to Roe v. Wade369 will be affected by the 
greater state protection such a determination may afford.  In 
addressing the first point, it is hard to deny that performing an 
abortion is a medical act.  While it may also be part of a doctor’s 
employment, the act itself involves medical decisions.  The 
examination of current federal attempts to restrict abortion 
rights370 exhibits how a finding that the act of performing an 
abortion is within the sphere of traditional state power affects the 
availability and right to the procedure. 
Congress has generally not opted to involve itself in the 
abortion debate through direct regulation.  Rather, it has used its 
spending power to influence state and private actions, mostly 
geared towards restricting abortion access.371  However, in 2003, 
 
 367. See Maggie Farley, U.S. Campaigns for Treaty to Ban Use of Embryo Stem Cells; 
Bush administration's proposal would prohibit human and therapeutic cloning for medical 
research. World body is divided on the issue, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2004, at A3. 
 368. Id. (“Nearly 130 nations, including close U.S. allies such as Britain, Japan 
and India, say that each nation should be allowed to decide for itself whether to 
regulate therapeutic cloning.”).  See also U.S. CONST. art. II § 2; Dupont Brief, supra 
note 301, at 15-18 (showing how a U.N. treaty may require Congress to pass 
legislation curtailing areas traditionally within the ambit of state sovereignty). 
 369. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 370. See, e.g., Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub L. No. 108-105 (117 
Stat.) (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2004)). 
 371. See Harris v. McRea, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding the denial of 
Medicaid funds for abortions); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding a 
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President Bush signed into law the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act 
(PBABA).372  Worded similarly to the HCPA, the ban prohibits 
“[a]ny physician who, in or affecting interstate or foreign 
commerce, knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion and 
thereby kills a human fetus shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.”373  Three United States 
District Courts in the summer of 2004 found the Act 
unconstitutional as written.374  None of these courts addressed 
Congress’ power to enact the law, despite one court even authoring 
a 173-page memorandum.375  Instead, the law has been found 
invalid under Stenberg v. Carhart376 because it fails to provide an 
adequate exception for the health of the mother.377 
If the PBABA was challenged on Commerce Clause grounds, 
Professor Allan Ides has argued that the Court would be hard 
pressed to find the Act does not invade a traditional state 
function.378  Not only does the PBABA parallel the wording of the 
HCPA,379 both laws seek to criminalize the performance of an act: 
there, “human cloning,” and here, performing an abortion.  As 
Professor Ides points out, it is also nearly identical to the VAWA, 
ruled unconstitutional in Morrison.380  The VAWA involved solely 
“an act of gender-based violence [and] is in no way dependent on 
the presence of a commercial transaction.”381 
The PBABA stands on equal footing with Congress’ attempts to 
prevent human cloning and violence against women.  None of the 
acts necessarily require the exchange of goods or services or some 
other economic transaction that generally invokes the need for 
national action.382  The mere act of performing an abortion is 
 
prohibition on the distribution of abortion related information by federally 
funded clinics). 
 372. Pub L. 108-105 (117 Stat.) (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2004)). 
 373. Id. (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a)). 
 374. See Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 808 (D. Neb. 2004); Nat’l 
Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Planned 
Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 960 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 375. Carhart, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 805. 
 376. 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
 377. See Nat’l Abortion Fed’n, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 487. 
 378. Allan Ides, The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 and the Commerce 
Clause, 20 CONST. COMMENT 441, 451 (2003). 
 379. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 108-18, at 2. 
 380. See Ides, supra note 378. 
 381. Id. at 446. 
 382. See supra notes 306-311 and accompanying text (explaining the distinction 
between needs giving rise to federal action and matters of traditional state 
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independent of any broader federal regulatory authority.  It is a 
medical function and is unrelated to any function beyond the 
regulation of medical care.  The decision to perform an abortion is 
a complex medical decision regarding the safety of the mother, the 
stage of fetal development, as well as other mental and physical 
health concerns.383  These decisions have been and may remain 
with state authorities if the Court is serious about applying the 
traditional state interest doctrine. 
With respect to state laws restricting abortion, a number of 
scholars have expressed concern that a strong states right’s position 
could allow states to prohibit abortion and eviscerate nationally 
protected rights.  Professor Marc Spindelman argues that although 
abortion is a constitutionally protected right, the Raich and Oregon 
v. Ashcroft “line of judicial thinking about states’ rights . . . is 
eminently capable of uprooting and overturning constitutional 
rights [that] the Court has recognized.”384  Specifically, Spindelman 
is concerned that courts will accept abortion as being within a 
traditional area of state health care concern and thus, be hesitant 
to restrict states from expanding or contracting the practice as they 
see fit.385  Without analyzing the issues in depth, it seems unlikely 
that the traditional state interest determination will allow states to 
pass laws that violate the Constitution.  The individual liberties 
expounded in the Constitution’s amendments are designed to 
prevent state interference with individual rights, even in areas 
traditionally left to the states.386 
The central debate in Raich that federal authorities cannot 
interfere with non-economic exclusively state functions does not 
give a state free reign to then interfere with rights granted under 
the Constitution.  In fact, respecting federalism may actually 
enhance federal authority to enforce the individual protections the 
Constitution provides.  Comity entails a respect for the separate 
spheres of power.  When those boundaries are more carefully 
 
concern). 
 383. See Hutton Brown et al., Special Project: Legal Rights and Issues Surrounding 
Conception, Pregnancy, and Birth, 39 VAND. L. REV. 597 (1986). 
 384. Marc Spindelman, A Dissent from the Many Dissents from Attorney General John 
Ashcroft’s Interpretation of the Controlled Substances Act, 19 ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 36-37 
(2003) (quoting Marc Spindelman, Protecting Suicide and Hurting Women, LEGAL 
TIMES, May 27, 2002, at 51). 
 385. Id. 
 386. See generally 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 388 (discussing the basic 
function of a bill of rights). 
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patrolled, the intrusion of one sovereign into the realm of the 
other commences only when necessary, not simply when desired.  
Limiting federal authority in commerce cases will reduce the 
overlap between state and federal regulations.  Thus, when 
Congress acts pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to protect the rights of United States citizens, Congress will more 
clearly be viewed as acting as a protectorate instead of just a policy 
maker. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Just what qualifies as a traditional state interest is unclear.  The 
determination will depend, at least in part, on the manner in which 
the activity at issue is classified.  However, independent of these 
aspects of Commerce Clause analysis, Raich has the potential to 
significantly impact health care by clarifying the extent to which 
the field is a traditional state concern in the midst of increasing 
federal involvement.  Although it is possible that the Court may 
resolve Raich without a significant discussion of the relationship 
between state and federal authority over health care, the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Oregon v. Ashcroft indicates that the issue will 
continue to be important, whatever the outcome of Raich.  As our 
discussion and analysis of the history of federal and state health 
care regulation reveals, a framework which distinguishes regulation 
of the doctor and patient relationship from regulation of the safety 
of prescription drugs or federal benefits spending may prove the 
most consistent with the historical understanding of the state’s 
traditional role in health care. 
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